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THE DIPLOMACY OF DISARMAMENT 
'I'he imperatives of survival in an atomic age have lent 
dqerate urgency to the search for security. But by their 
very nature they have hugely emptied that search of content 
and meaning. Fear has driven men to negotiate and fear has 
averted agreement. There can, it is said, be no trust without 
disarmament and no disarmament without trust. 
Meanwhile, the p w e r  of annihilation grows to a point 
where mere accident could unleash devastation, and nations 
lesg practiced in the arts of self-restraint may come to hold 
that power in the not ltoo distant future. 
The unavailing struggle of the past decade and a half to 
establish "a system for the r-lation of armaments," as pro- 
vided for in the United Nations Charter, has been the 
subject af searching inquiry and heated controvmy. Each 
observer makes his own interpretation of the factrr and clings 
tenaciottsly to his own prognosis. The author of the present 
article also has a point of view, and it is one with which 
there will doubtless be some disagreement. Nevertheless, it  
it hoped that this schematic effort to analyze rhc disarrna- 
ment negotiations since 1445 will help to sharpen the issues 
and will provide insights into the Sisyphean tmk of prevent- 
ing man from destroying himself. 
JOSEPH NOGEE, Assistant Rofes9or of Political Science, 
University of Houston, has devoted himself for several years 
to the question of d i i m e n t .  It was the subject of hb 
doctoral dissertation at Yale University and of several articles, 
including the disarmament sections of the 1988 and 1959 
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THE FIRST SUC~CESSFUL explosion of an atomic bomb, on 16 
July 1945 in New Mexico, inaugurated a new era in the his- 
tory of arms development. It also marked a new era in the 
problem of armament control. Only twenty days previously. 
the delegates of Mty nations had signed the Charter of a new 
world organization whose principal politiml organ was made 
responsible, inter alias "for foxmulathag . . . plans . . . for the 
establishment of a system for the regulation aE armaments."' 
OC course, the atomic bomb was at that t h e  a closely guapd- 
ed military secret. Whether public awareness of the existence 
of this new weapon would have resulted in a more p i t i v e  
commitment to disarmament is only a matter of speculation. 
Almost fifteen years have passed. Instead of moving toward 
disarmament or even controlled regulation of arm, the ma- 
jor powers have tteen involved in tbe greatest arms race 
known to man. The fictora that have bustrated the expecta- 
tiom of 1945 are by nuw well known. They are, prlncipdly, 
a miou deterioration in relations among the major powers, 
whose ccmmsus is necessary to create an arms agreement, 
and tht development of an arms technology, the control of 
which would involve considerable infringement of national 
sovereignty. And yet, almost su+EagTy in view of this situ- 
ation, the past decade and a half has witnessed almost ccajp 
less negotiations about arms agreements, and both the United 
States and the Soviet Union are agreed that "the quation of 
general disarmament is the most important one facing the 
world t ~ d a y ~ ' ~  
1 Charter of the Udwd Hktim, krt 26. 
~ ~ m u n i q u b  issued b Rcddmt Eknhower ead Premier ~ c h e v ,  
0 Sept. 1959. k p r o d d  in U.S. Deponmcnt of State Bulbin, Vol. XW, 
NO. la59 (12 oa. 1959. p. m. 
In order to undexstand more fully the disarmament prab- 
lern as of 1960 a brief review is necessary. This study will 
focus upon three aspects of the problem: first, the changing 
aspects of the disarmament neptiations since 1945; sewnd, 
the principal obstacles to a Soviet-Western power agreement; 
and third, some of the pI i t ia l  uses ta which disarmament 
negotiations have been put. 
Two of the principal diEculties in predicting success or 
failure in disarmament negotiations are the changing plit i -  
cal aIi,o;nments in interaatianal politics and the new develop- 
ments in weapons tecbolagy. Both relate to the questions 
of who is to be disarmed and what instruments of war are to 
IN denied to nations. 
In the months immediately following the end of 'CVurlcl 
War 11, disarmament was thought of principally in connec- 
tion with the defeated powers and, indeed, was actually 
enforced far a time vhh-vis Germany and Japan. Article 26 
of the United Nations Charter, however. anticipated the 
c~eatiion of an intamationat system regulating armaments. 
Clearly such a system wouId have to be multiIarera1. By vest- 
ing primary responsibility for disarmament in the Securit~ 
Council, the Charter provided, furthermore, for a multilar- 
cral formulation of this spm. 
Little more than a year after defeat of the Axis, the Paris 
Peace C o M  highlighted the beginning of im entirely 
new political alignment. By d y  1947 the division between 
the Axis powers and the AlBd coalition had been replaced 
by that between the Weatem d~~~ and the Soviet 
Union. This disruption of Allied unity was to have profound 
consequences for the multilateral disarmament arrangements 
implied in the Chapter* One of the fundamental assumptions 
behind all the pmvisicrns relaring to the Security Council 
had been that the Big Five (China, France, the USSR, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States) would have to work 
together toward a world-wide spwm. But what the Soviet 
Union and Western powers have k e n  seeking, witb few ex- 
ceptions in the past fourteen years, is disarmament of each 
other-a far different matter. 
Initially forced to negotiate within the hmeurork of the 
h r i t y  Council and related bodies, the major powers soon 
found themselves in a smi t  jacket. The formal rules d a 
United Nations organ, the maintenance of a public official 
record, and the inclusion of "extraneous" nations in the 
negotiating group have, from the point of view of both sides, 
k e n  obstacles to attaining a disarmament agreement. As a 
result, rnultilateraI negotiations for an agreement to apply 
to many nations have gradually been displaced in favor of 
nepfiations between East and West aimed at disarming only 
a few nations, at least initially. Taking into consideration 
the intensity of debate and the accomplishments of ne-goti- 
ating Wie, one can note that the trend has been for the 
more h i t l u l  groups to be smaller and to center around the 
Big Four-France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and h e  
United S t a t e ~ f t e n  outside the United Nationa 
As regards the scope of these negotiations, changes in 
weapons technology have exercised a determining influence. 
Disarmament has mditionally referred to the abolition of 
armies, navies, and fortifications or to a reduction in the 
number of men under arms, tanks, guns, ships, aircraft, and 
other equipment. The birth of atomic weapons immediately 
involved the United Nations in negotiating toward a much 
wider goal: international control over the complete produc- 
tion of a potentially major industry. But that effect was only 
t empmy.  As existing stocks grew and the destructive power 
of nuclear weapons increased (to theoretically unlimited 
pmprtions), the difficulty of negotiating an agreement also 
increased. The development of intermediate-range ball is tic 
missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) during the latter part oE the 1950s compounded the 
difficulty of reaching agreement on reduction or regulation 
of armaments and of devising a "Eoolproaf' control system. 
Consequently, disarmament efforts have been concernd 
with more limited goals. In lieu of an agreement on com- 
prehensive arxlrs reduction or reguIation, the major powers 
have sought agreement on partial disarmament rneasurcs 
requiring less drastic control systems. Since the 1955 summit 
meeting in Geneva, digcussions have been more and more 
concerned with questions relating to prevention of 5urprk 
attack and to "'confidence-building" first step. Even ear- 
rower in mpe has been the one question on which there is 
currently more than a alight hope of agreement-cessation 
of nuclear testing. 
The Changing Framework of Negotiations 
THE BREAXDOWN of attempts to negotiate a general post-war 
disarmament agreement was the direct result sf the mld war. 
Agreement on regulating arms had k e n  envisaged as a com- 
plement to the establishment of an international d t y  
system. fn describing the anticipated operation of the Secur- 
ity Council, Secretary of State Cordell HuII had swessed that 
it was based upon the assumption that "each a£ [the major 
powers] will maintain adequate form and will be willing 
to use such forces as circumstances require to prevent w 
suppress all cases of aggres~ion."~ Under Article 45 of the 
Charter all Members of the Organization were to u n d d e  
to make available to the Security Council, in accordance with 
agreements to be conduded, the armed forces neceS5ary to 
maintain international peace. Plans for the application of: 
armed force were to be made by the Security Council with 
the assistance of the Military Staff Committee (Article 46). 
This was the same committee that, under Article 26, was to 
mist the Security Council in formufating plans for arms 
regulation. Relying upon the mistance of the same group 
to create both an international army and a system of a r m s  
regulation may s e a  unusual, but it was a natural wnse 
quence of what the major powers nrnsirltered to be a neces- 
sary interconnection. 
The Military Staff Committee never was able to fulfdl 
its mandate under Article 26. It immediately became dead- 
locked on the problem of creating an armed force for use by 
the Security Council. On 50 April 1947 the Committee re- 
a Memorandum for rhe M h t ,  29 IEce. 1943. Quoted in Inis L. Claude. 
Jr, Strnadt Inlo Plwshrrr(!s, 2nd rd. mew York, Random H o w  19!59), 
p" 85. 
43g 
ported to the Security Chuncil its recornmeadations for the 
organization of a collective force. Of the fortyane artieEes 
in its report not more than twenty-five had secured unani- 
mous agreement; and the sixteen articles on which there waa 
no harmony canrained the mwt impartant elements of an 
international force? With the hilure of the Military Staff 
Committee, any immediate paspects far a system of a r m  
regulation within a United Nations security framework died. 
The first seriou p t -war  disarmament negotiations took 
place within the United Nations Atomic Energy Chmmis- 
sion, which had been created on 24 January 1946 under the 
fint resolution of the first General Asslemblv. Its member- I 
ship was the same as that of the Security &ncil (with the 4 
addition of Canada whenever that country was not a member 
of the C~unci l ) .~  For twenty-one months it served as the prim I cipal arena for disarmament negotiations, since a& that time , 
the ~n'ited States held that some sort of control over atomic 
energy would be necessary before success in the general area 
of xhe regtilation of armaments would be p i b l e .  On 17 
May 1948 the Commission adopted its third and final r e p t ,  
the lint sentence of which noted succinctly: "The Atomic 
Energy Commission repats that it has read& an 
Previously, on IS February 1947, the Security Council had 
established ;he cammission for ~onventionai Armaments, 
with the same members hi^ as the Comcil. This Commission 
was unable to rmrd anyamore success than its atomic coun- 
terpart, and Erm mid-1948 until &he spring of 1954 there 
rvere for a11 practical purposes no serious negotiations. 
4 k  Rcpwt of the Milftary Staft Eolrnmittn, in United Natbns &?mrity 
Cwadl. Om&l Records (5CQR): 2nd Year, 1947, Spec. Suppl. No. 1. 
S C h ~ d a  was included bccauc, along wi th  the United States and Unitcd 
Kingdom. i t  p a s a d  the knowledge essential tc tbe usc of atomic energy. 
Canadian dentists had rcidpnted in the wartime r d  and dewtop. 
rnrnt of the atomic bomkmd Canadian u M l w  was im irnpmrnr mars 
fix the ftrel that went inm tbe bomb. 
R q r t  to the Security Coundl. 17 Map 1918, in United N a b  
Atomic Energy CkmamMon~ 0- Rcmndr (UNAEC, OR): 3rd Year1 Sper 
suppl, p. 1. 
On 29 July 1949 h e  Atomic Energy C o m i ~ i o n  acknowl- 
edged that for it to hold further discusaians would serve "no 
practicable or usefial purpose" and called upon the Spon- 
soring Powers (the Big Fiw and Canada) to get together 
privately? Although six-power discussions in late 1949 and 
debate in the General Assembly offered no punch to expect 
more success from private than from public discussions, tbe 
fourth General Assembly called upan the six to continue 
their consultations. The year 1950, however, proved to be 
one of silence. After the USSR walked out of the Security 
Council and the two disarmament Commissions in January, 
and the Korean war began, disarmament talb broke down 
completely. 
ConaozracrttOn of Udred Nerdom E m  
I 
In an e8Em to restructure the negotjatiom, tbe Geaesal 
Aescmbly on 11 January 1952 created a single Dismmmcnt 
Commission to replace and encoapass the work of the 
I Canrnirrioru on both atomic energy and mnvenrional arm- 
aments? But any expectation that an amalgamred commb 
] &ion wouId facilitate agreement an an over-all disaneament 
I plan w a  disproved by the first two yearsn work of the Com- 
I mission. An interim f h t  report of the Commission on 28 
May 1952 merely noted that "he discussions . . . are contin- 
uing." A second repert appmved in October 1952 summar- 
ized the futile dellates? The seventh General Assembly that 
year prodded the Corrrmissian to further &omI but to no 
avail. Bemeen the seventh and eighth sessions of the Assem- 
bly the COmmkion held only one meeting. 
7 k  UNAEG 01: 4th Year. No, 8.24th Mtg, 29 July 1940, p. 5 4  far thc 
United States draft mlutim, 
&In bclared reempition of t Rvvd a connc~don votn ktwccn 2. a W c  and wnvm- 
(Sonal mmamena, President Trumm had m k d  Llnircd States policy two 
suggcsrlq that h Am& Enngp Gmmiaaion and thc mm P ~ W ~ Y  b& 
Commixdon lor oeatinnd Armam- momate  their work in ~ n c  
ammimion. 
*See United Nations Disarm8ment ~ m r n i s h ,  Oflciel Rccotdsr 1% Re- 
t, ?bp&merit Ew A dl, May, and June 195% D4C. DCJLI. plm 12, a d  & acpms Spr. ~ u ~ ~ f  Me. 1. magex*. 
By 1953 the USSR .had subtantially redud the gap in 
atomic power between it and the United Stam and had 
dcvelopd a sizable atackpile of atomic weapons.' In August 
of that year it exp1oded a hydrogen device--only some nine 
months after the Gsst such explosion by the United States. 
Differentiation between the great and lesser powers had d- 
ready bem carried a step further by the United Kingdom's 
demonsnation in October of the previous year that it p 
jcssed an atomic weapon. Aware of the increased importance 
of agreement between the leaders of the two sides before 
any disarmament could be achieved, the eighth General 
Assembly asked the Disarmament Commission to "study the 
desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of 
representatives of the Powers principally involved, which 
should aeek 'in private an acceptable sulution."l0 This a p  
pmch was supported by the Big Four foreign ministers at 
their conference in BerIin in the spring of 1954. 
With the establishment of the D b m t  Com&ionrs 
fivepower S u b C o m m i t t d n a d a ,  France, the USSR, the 
United Kingdom, and the United Stilt- 19 April 1954, 
negotiations entered a new phase. For the next bur years, 
meetings were conducted in private. The SubCommitset 
held five major series of discussions: I3  May-22 June 1954; 
25 FebrrtqI8 May 1955; 29 August-7 October 1955; 19 
March4 May 1956; and 18 March4 September 1957. During 
this period every phase of dkamament w considered at one 
time or another. At various times the p u p  was reported 
nearing an agreement but, whEIe positions changed on both 
sides and a healthy "darification of views" took place, the 
net rtsult remained a stalemate. The fifth and last report of 
the Sub-Committee was submitted on 6 Septeniber 1957 "as 
1aCeneral AsfembIy W. 715 (VnI), 28 Nov. 1955..Although the W e t  
rcprescnladvc ahpinad, this waa thr first time since 1946 that the USSR 
had not voted againat an Assembly rcwlutian on diurmutleat. 
a M e r  progreS1P report."'l Since then, however, neither the 
SubCollunittee nor, except for one purely fmd meeting, 
its parat M y  has met. These SubCodttee m h g  
were, in fact, the h t  negotiations held under tbc direct 
auspices of the United Nations. 
Since 1957 there has been further bipolarization of Soviet- 
Western efforts. Two h c t m  conaibuted to this. One was 
Soviet dissatkhction with the numerid dominance of West- 
ern powers at negotiating sesiom-hence the Soviet demand 
for *'prity" between the two sides. The other was United 
States unwillingness to increase the number of negotiators 
on the ground that too many nations makc a graup unwieldy 
and result only in propagandistic speeches. An attempt to 
compromise these views at the twelfth General Assembly 
satisfied no one. The membership of the Dismament Com- 
mission was enlarged from twelve, of which tcn wcrt bound 
to the United States by military treaties, to twenty-five, of 
which sixteen were United States allies. This change was 
considered inadequate by the USSR, which boycotted the 
Cornmiasion and thus made any meeting pointleas. In 1958 
the General Assembly acceded to Soviet demands and en- 
larged the Disarmament Commission to include all Members 
of the United Nations, but no more use has 'been made of it 
than of the twenty-five member group 
Nevertheless, the past two years have seen an intensifica- 
tion of disarmament diplomacy among the great powers* in 
the context of direct East-West conhntations. In the spring 
of 1958 President Eisenhower and Premier Khmhchev en- 
gaged in an exchange of correspondence that resutmi In 
agreemenu ro hold two conferences of experts on two differ- 
a t  aspects of disarmament: surprise attack and cessation of 
nuclear weapons tests. In compliance with Premier Khrush- 
tw rcpm are cantPintd in, rcsptctivcl . United Nationr l?m. 
OClU, PP June 19Y1; DC/?I, 1 ht. 1955; D C / ~ .  I May 1951; DC/IlP, 
1 Aug. 1957; ond DC/llS, 11 EL 1957. 
chev's histence on the principle of "equal representation 
of muntries which are members of the Attantic Pact and . . . 
the Warsaw Treaty" the membership of the surprise attack 
conference was limited to five nations from each of the re- 
spective g r ~ u p . ~  It met in Geneva in late 1958 but after 
thirty sessions d hitless sp-g abandoned its &or& 
Considerably more s u c c d l  was the "C8xrference of Ex- 
perts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a 
Possible &cement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests." It met 
from 1 July through 21 A u p t  1958. Participating in the 
conference were experts fkom four Westeh countries (Can- 
ada, France, United Kingdom, United States) and four East- 
ern (eeechoslovdia, Polad, Romania, USSR). It was a 
strictly scientific and technical assemblage. It h3d no man- 
&te to nqptiate an actual cessation but was m@ly to report 
on the feasibility and quiremknh of a control syatem. Per- 
hap beotusu its tasfr was so limited, this technical conference 
was an unqualified s u m  rare phenomenon in p t -  
World War I1 hiotoy. 
Spumed on by this achievement, the three nudear powers 
agreed in late summer 1958 to hold a second conference on 
cessation of nuclear tests, this one given the more political 
task of developing a detailed agreement between the USSR, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States to end nudear 
weapons tests and to create a control system to s u m  the 
ban. This conference has been meeting intermittently since 
31 October 1958. 
Second only to the Berlin q%estion, d' warmanent was 
among the principal subjects of dknssion among the foreign 
ministers and at the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks in 1959. 
One result has been the formation of a new ten-member & 
- lagovie; note of 15 Scpt. 1958. d u d  in ~ . ~ . ' ~ c ~ a r h m t  of State 
Bulle1im, Vol XXXIX* No. I M 9  $ C h  1958). p. 649. The tm aa.th 
were the same as thaac making u the new diaarmarncnt mmmittae formcd 
br 1959 acepr that Bnlgaril rt?- Albania in the 111m My. AL the 
rurprk attack mnfenna and L c  conk-oc ol ex ta on n u b  mu 
the War had a  tingle delegation &at included n a ~ i o m r a ~  the vzdws mun- 
tries. The East, in contrast, sent q x m m  national delegntiom. Thh d i -  
cnce ma hare importance wilh regad to htunc r kuamm 
-&p. 
- DR pnrity ~f 
armament committee, again outside the framework of the 
United Nations; it was scheduled to begin consideration of 
the over-all problem of disarmament early in 1950. Compris- 
ing the new group are Canada, France, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
PoIand, Romania, and the USSR. With the inclusion of the 
Eastern European states, the Soviet Union ha9 at last 
achieved the parity in a general arms negotiating group it 
has sought for years. In eEect, it is the East and W e t  as 
blocs &at are now bargaining. 
It should be noted, however, that any decisions reached 
will be reported to the United Nations through its eighty- 
I 
two member Disarmament Commission. The fourteenth 
General Assembly has accepted this arrangement, for, id- 
though today bipolarization of disarmament negotiations 
has been carried further than ever before, disarmament re- w mains one of the principal concerns of the United Nations. 
I 
The ten-nation committeens reports to the Disarmament 
Commission will be debated by the General Amembly. In 
addition, the Secretariat will service the committee and the 
Serretafy-Gmeral will be represented at its meetings, Beyand 
this, it is not yet certain what role the United Nations will 
play as the new group goes into action. 
The Changing Scope of Negotiations 
NOTHING HIGHLIGHTS the problem of disarmament in the 
cold war more than the changing scope and subject matter 
aE the negotiations. Largely, of course, lhese changes mirror 
changes in technological development. But the influence of 
changing technology is subtle and pervasive, and not con- 
fined to merely dcterrnining what new weapons--be they 
space satellites or rnissiles--could be outlawed. Changing 
weapons systems bring changes in military strategy and tac- 
tics, and these "secondary changes" have a further impact 
on the goals of disarmament efforts. 
T h e  post-war period has witnessed a staggering improve- 
ment in offensive weapons without a corresponding im- 
provement in defensive armaments, Initially, this resulted in 
a wide extension of the goals established for disarmament 
negotiations. As, Ilowever, the unchecked offensive power of 
the major states increased, there was a corresponding de- 
crease in the goals of disarmament. GeneraIly the pattern 
has been as follows: during the middle and late 1940s the 
ultimate objective was virtually the elimination of war itself 
-the widest possible goal-through international control 
of atomic energy. When attainment oE this end became pro- 
gressively less likely, it was replaced by the more rnndest one 
of reducing international tension and establishing "confr- 
dence-building" first steps. Different means have variously 
been sought, such as the  disclosure and verification of arma- 
ments information, renunciation of the use of nuclear weap- 
ons, and measures to guard against a surprise attack. Since 
1957 the mest viable goal in sight has been the limited one 
of dimination of further radioactive co~ltan~ination i the 
atmasphere, This is onc of tbt p h i p a l  reasom for all t8c 
recent conmn with cemtian of nuclear tests. 
Focrw Upon the Ahnt 
The devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought h m t  
to peoples throughout the world the incaleulabIe desmctioa 
and amage that would result b r a  any future war involving 
the use of atomic b m k .  CDupled with the memariles of all 
the horrors and sacrifices of the just-forrctudd World War, 
it produced a strong reaction against war itselfIf Even bcforc 
the first General Assembly had time to consider the g e n d  
principles of gost-war disarmament, it was called upon to 
take immediate action on the problem of atomic weapons. 
The newlyaeated Wnitd Nations Aroreic Energy Commk 
sion was urged to devise "with the utmost despatch" a p h  
for eliminating atomic weapons from natiud 
For almost a decade control of nuclear weapons remained 
the chief cornern of disarmament negotiations. The Western 
sorlution, embodied in the proposals submitted by Bernard 
M. Baruch on behalf of the United States government, m 
for an International Atamic Development Authority to have 
a monopoly on the world's production a£ atomic energy. 
The Authoriry was to have exclusive control of all atomic 
activities from the mining of raw material to the production 
and use of fissionabk fuel. In addition to owning and man- 
aging a11 uranium and thorium mines, reheries, chemical 
separation plants, and reactors, it was to have exclusive 
authority to engage in atomic research. 'This plan was otkrtd 
as more than just a means to eliminate the use af one terrible 
weapon, It was, if accepted, to be the basis for extensive in- 
ternational cooperation for peace. In introducing the plan 
Bernard Baruch 9aid: 
In the elimination of war lies our solution, for a d  tbtn will 
nations cease to compete with one another in the T J uction: and 
uu of dread "secret" weapons which are cvduatJso~c1~ by their 
18 Genenl ADanbly Rcr. 1 0 . 2 4  Jan. 1946. 
apadty to kill. . . . If we s u d  in finding a suitab1c way to 
control atomic weapons, it i s  rereanable to hope that we may 
also preclude the use of other weapons adaptable to mass detrue- 
tion, When a man learns to say "'A"' he can, if he chooses. learn 
the rest of the alphabet, tama4 
Fmm the Soviet pint of view the whole plan was "th0x"ough- 
ly vicious and unaaeptabk"; inst- the USSR p ~ e d  k
a simple meaty outIawing all atomic weapons-but with mh- 
imal control measures. When, in the winter of 1947, the 
Barn& Plan was first considered before the Security Council, 
Andrei Gromyko definitively rrjeaed it, mying: "Only p 
ple who have lost the sense of realiq can seriously believe in 
the p ib i l i tp  of creating such mgementsa"w Debate on 
the Baruch Plan continued for several years thereafter, but it 
boiled dawn tr, little more &an a war of words. Techno- 
logid factors, which raised the problem in &e first place, 
eventually made the plan outmoded: once a secret stockpile 
has been accumulated, there ia no known method by which 
it em be controlled unleas a nation voluntarily relinquishes 
its supply. By the early 1950s not only had the United States 
accumulated such a stockpile but so had the USSRSM C S -  
cidly neither the Western powers nor the United Nations 
disavowed the Em& P h  However, the failure of the 
United Nations in 1953 to re-hdbe9e the plan and the fail- 
ure of the United States to mention it in its 1954 propoaeals 
constituted tacit recognition that its was outdated. 
T h e  hI1 implication of the faiInre to establish interna- 
tional control over atomic energy was that henceforth no 
disarmament meaty could guarantee a dimmed world. It 
meant and continua to mean that international pence and 
14 Statement of 14 Sum 1946 tci Uniocd Nationr Atomic E a q  ' 
RLpmauud in ~ ~ n c n ~  a d  Scmriq: A Col&ctia of i l o o l - v ~  
1955, Subcoaodttce on Disarmamcat, h t c  Cermnitkae on Pordgn Rcla- 
tIoons, BA& CDng., 2nd Sesa (Washington, 196s)# p. 1%. This mllmion re- 
pmdaca many key docurtlcna Jnduding srrme orighally publish& in the 
&cia1 TCEO& of United N a t h  bdics. Hearafter dtad an US Donrmants. 
1ESCOR: 2nd Ycu, No. e2, 115th M .. 5 Mnr. 1917, rssow a h  e.pmi.g im o m  .$- b m b  in !ii?*e MCL gm- 
emmcnt gave norice d ita intalian tcl keep on producing atomic wtppom 
until the llniled States qpcd to ban rbcm. b Pm&, Orr tW. 
m r i t y  must ultimately be haxi upon oorrditiogs other 
than complete disarmament. Even if a comprehensive agree- 
ment on armaments were negotiated, and even if it included 
a prohibition of the production and lase a£ nuclear weapons, 
there is no guarantee that one or more of the major pavers 
might not have a reserve of nuclear h m b s  ready-just in 
case. 
The effect of this situation was to turn disarmament nego- 
tiations in the direction of estalslisliing oficient confidence 
between the two sides so that a limited agreement might be 
negotiated. An e h t  in this direction had been started in 
the Cammission for Conventional Armaments, but the de- 
teriorating state of East-West relations during its lifetime 
(1947-52) had hstrated agreement an even so much as a 
work plan. In 1948 the Commission could only note that a 
system regulating and reducing armaments could not be put 
into effect in the absence of "an atmosphere of international 
confidence and security." 
Measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments which 
would follow the establishment of the necessary degree oE confi- 
dence might in turn be expected to increase confidence and so 
justify further measures of regulation and reduction.17 
Prior co the Korean war two substantive p I m  were offered 
to stimulate this international confidence. One was a plan 
proposed by the Soviet spokesman at the General Assembly 
in 1948. Axldrei Vyshinsky called upon the permanent mem- 
bers of the Security Council to reduce by om-third all cur- 
rent land, naval, and air forces. The other was a plan 
advanced by France in the Commissian for Conventional 
Armaments in 1949 for the collection, verification, and p u b  
lication of infomation on existing armaments and armed 
forces. Vyshinsky's pian was rejected because it included no 
27 Rc~Iutfon ot the Working C ~ d t l c t ,  26 ul 1948, UnitEd Nations 
YCJ/II. p. 7. ~uated in * n h w  Martin, EoiL t iu r  Mmrity: 1 pmg- 
rusr R-t (Par& UNXSCO, 1952), p, 85. 
means of verifmtion (d was aLso Cid to a phibition of 
all ammic and the Fwach plan was rejected by 
the USSR on the pun& that it provided for no disarma- 
ment and would bc used merely for gathering secret inteIli- 
p c c  Momation. When the new Disarmamens Commission 
began work in the spring of 1952, it continued dong essen- 
tially the striae lines as the Commission £or Conventional 
Armaments, except that atomic as well as conventional weap 
o m  were indudd in a United States plan for p g m a i v s  
and mntinuing disclosure and v&cation of armed forces 
and armaments. 
Negotiations in the D i a m e n t  Commission during the 
Korean war were particularly sterile, for understandable 
reasom. Nmealling and mutual remiminations left no 
room for serious debate. During the spring and summer of 
1952, two propoQala were offered by the Wmt which, though 
barely considered by the USSR at the time, marked a move 
ment in a new direction. The h i t  of these, offered on 28 
May 1952, was a tripartite ppoeal for hing  numerid 
limitations w all m e d  forces. Its objective was "to reduce 
the possibility and fear of aggression and to avoid a dislequi- 
librium a£ power danguoug to international peace and sec- 
urity." No attempt was made to achieve a comprehensive 
agreement. It suggested among other features a ceiling of 
1.000.000-1,500,000 m e n  each for China, the USSR, and the 
United Stam, and of 700,000-800,000 each for France and 
the United K i q g i ~ r n . ~  The second proposal, offered on 24 
June, was a Frmch one interlinking various measures of 
disclosure and verification with various measure of disarma- 
ment in three stages. Novel in these approaches wars the 
Western emphasis on a numerim1 limitation to armed man- 
pwcr and on convmtianal disartnmmt by stages, with a 
comesponding controP by stages. But any diplomacy had of 
necearity an air of unreality while aggression was being 
fought in the Wsfidd and arm thunselves were being 
utilized in Karea to h tcr  an East-West disequilibrium, 
The years covering the work of the D-mt Sub 
C d t t t e  (1954-57) are not d y  d d b c d  becaw of 
their cmplexity and cht proliferation of difftrcnt p'opmds 
emanating from the private =ions. In all, tht SuMhamit- 
tee submitted five reporn contairhg a total of sevmtyane 
ducumefltary Bnnf!x.cs. 
P ~ o p a d s  far ' P W  
Dwhg 1954 and early 1955 a spate of pmpmb and ceun- 
tcr-propagals was exchanged between the two rid=" They 
came in m y  form: warking p a p  m m d ,  &lam- 
tiom, resolutions. None was in any sense a detailed disarma- 
ment plan; they wnre mainly skeletons of possible plans to be 
Mled in by future Disarmameat Cornmimion miwu or, in 
swnc cases, by contemplated world disarmament eorikrmces. 
The mast important of these outlines were thoae aubmirted 
by the French and British jointly in June 1954 (which the 
Soviet govenuncnt later accepted as a "bk for n ~ h -  
tiolwm'), by the Western powers in March 1955, and by the 
USSR in May 1955. In substance, agreement betwen the 
*et Union and the Westera powera r&td ru &ivc 
as ever. But in scope their prapds  all dad e lcm~tr  in cam- 
mon. They a11 prooided far a mmpr&cnsive and ''pbsd* 
' dhmament p r q m n  Both side agreed that them should 
. bt a reduction in conventional armaments and fore- aa well 
j, PC am eventual abolition of atomic weapom, sad tkat this 
radDCtiw should takc place in stages. This appmeh was 
aadorsed by the General Assembly on 4 November 1954 
rPItb the mncuming vote of the U S R  Not dme 1946 had 
&em been a unanimous deckion by she great powcrs on a 
t4bmammt ~emlution. 
I &bind this apparent unanimity, however, them remahad 
the bdamental disgust and suspicion that one side would 
t at the other's expease d d n g  the application of the 
&Merent stages. One partimlarlp important indication of the 
hpmkidity of discasions during thi period was the facr 
&at the United States, in a proposal of May 1954 for aa 
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international control otgan to s u m  cx)nvetlti'kmaJ and 
atomic disarmament, implicitly abandoned the Baruch Plan 
but offered nothing En substance to replace it. The United 
States did call Ear establishment d a United Nations 
Disarmament and Atomic DeveIopent Authority. ?BE 
authority, undm the United States plan, 
would be empowered to function in a d c e  with whatever 
plan may be agreed upon for the mnml of atomic energy to the 
extent necessary to ensure effective prohibition of nu& weap 
ons and use of nudear materials for peadid purposes ~ d y . ~  
How atomic energy was to be eonmllcd so &at a prohibi- 
tion could be enforced was not s p c i f ~ e d  
AEI the hrSE p t - w a r  decade came to an end, technulogid 
developnena in the a r m  race mrnpclled a major reconsid- 
eration of the whole problem of dkmament. M u s l y  
the main concern of all negotiations had k n  international 
control of atamic weapom, The radid  Baruch Plan had 
migimUy been advocated on the ground that only it, ole 
something compmb1t to it, could guarantee the ahlute  
security from atomic war that w a  u n i v d l y  d a i r d  To- 
ward the latter part of the decade, Western spokesmen began 
referring to the ~~ of a "point of no rct.uml'--the 
moment when no syswm of contra1 mn cnsure security 
against violators because the amount of atomic materia1 in 
exiatence defies accounting for and involve a "margin of 
error" too great to accept. Strangely, there was almost no 
discussion of this problem in the USSR's public statmeats 
or in its press, By the early 1950s tbat point of no return had 
been reachd 
An additional factm reducing the likelihood of kt-- 
tional control of atomic energy was the progressive integra- 
tian of atomic and conventional weapons in the armed foxes 
of the United States beginning in late 1951, after a series of 
Rcprod~cad in iMd, p. 3w. 
a m i c  tests in Nevada proved for the first tirne that &rid 
atomic weapons could be used effectively in combat. In 
January 1952 President Truman's announcement of a five- 
to six-billion dollar expansion of atomic energy fac i l i t i e  
the largest expansion since the formation of the United 
States Atomic Energy Commission-indicated that the b t -  
tleneclcs that had stood in the way of a vast program had 
been surmounted. The United States' growing reliance an 
atomic weapons was not limited to its own continental de- 
fense, but was, logically, extended to the North Atlanric 
Treaty Organization, then looked upon as the West's princi- 
pal buIwark against Soviet expansion. General E k m h w e ~ ,  
then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, intimated in 
his first annual report (2 April 1952) that NATO forces were 
being equipped with tactical atomic weapons: 
The military farces we are building must be continually and- 
fied to kee pace w i h  new weapons. . . . We are at the very point, 
for examp P e, of seeing a whale sequence of fundamental &an 
made in response to the development of new typa of arms. X 
tendency in recent decades to produce weapons of greater.range, 
penetrating power and destructiveness is ac~elerating.~ 
As the revolution in the destructiveness of wlgapons was 
spinning itself out, a new revolution in the delivery of 
weapons was beginning. During the 1950s, developments in 
guided and ballistic missiles reached the point where they 
could be considered operational. When combined with 
atomic weapons, they added a new dimension ro the potency 
of offensive weapons because there was no known method 
of stbppieg or intercepting them. 
New 'Pmehgd Pmpo~rdr 
These scientific and miltnry developments were reffecttd 
in I955 in a change in the scope of disarmament disclmiorw, 
Insofar as atomic weapons themselves were not likely to be 
~Dwumcnts  on Amcrienn FacSgn Relations, 1952, mi. Clma W. Baler 
md Richard P, Stabbiw (New Yo* Harprr for the Council an Forclgn 
R&tionsp 1953). p. 189. 
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cop1ts01lcd, c b  were directed toward getting: agreement 
on more limited guarantees. This constituted a signibnt 
contraction of the immediate aims of disannamenr, To guide 
the administration in io foxmulation of a new approach 
Raidcnt Eislenhower on I9 March 1955 appointed Harold 
manna- E. Staclaea as Specid Assistans to toe Resident fur D  
mcnt. Mr. Stassen rn given cabinet status, an unpr&tnt- 
Ed pit ion in United Sta te  history for an ofkial i p m - e d  
with such a Limited aspect of for t ip  poky. 
Two major q t s  of propaah made in the spring and sum- 
mer of 1955 %eralded the change indkmament pole. The 
k t  was the important Soviet package prqmd, of 10 M ~ Y  I 
1955. Sane of its pmvisiom were mnc&ions, such as fore 
reductians at levels the West p r e w  on e9 'March 1955 
(1,000,1000-1,500,00O for Chh,  the USSR, and the Unit& 
States. and 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom). 
It also accepted an Anglo-French pro+ that use of nu- 
dear weapas be prohibited at the time that 75 per cent of 
the reductions in conventional forces was reached, and that 
all. nuclear weapons be eliminated when 100 per cent of the 
conventional reductiom had been carried out. In addition, 
it mntaincd a new provision for cessation of nuclear weagbns 
tars, as one af the first s t e p .  
F a  the b t  time rhe USSR publicly h o w l e d g e d  that 
no known system d detection could b e t  out a m t  cache 
of hydrogen or atomic weapons. "In such a sitpation/ re 
ported the Soviet nqptiators, "security. . .-amnot be war- 
anted since the possibility would be open to a potential 
aggressor to acamulaw stocks of atomic and hydrogem weap 
om £w a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving States.'" 
They repeated the theme that agreement was made difficult 
in the atmosphere of "international tension and mistrust in 
relatiom bttwten Stam." 
Mtr~ of e sort m beirr erected even in regard to tht in- 
terchange of 1in usnial, agxi d turd, scientific, cultural an8 other 
delegations. Such a situation makes difiictrlrlt the attainment of 
agreement wqpuding the admission by Stam to their enterprim, 
&ma-p pat JOJ uopepanoj aqa q um%slCs E tpns 
TFD~~SUI pwnm a~pap jo m~qoad pum pue Sufswlpp 
aq~ uv&~ a~o1ds am aeq uq ium~dm~ amto s! Bqtpon 
pp9 qqa u -suo~~~ysa~ pu%8 jo uogelop Aq JO TEJ 
-ar rnppns iq atpap dsaptms ltqa*g ou aq UeJ hog lq 
a Wua st~qrrlsa h!pu ~3adm! pule a@ns oa dm aIqrr 
-pdap2a 1s aarg % w-$qqaaa dq paq~o~dde aq am sou Aem 
tuarmrlartr ja uoswpql p mafqard atp .r;ltpaqfi 3ap;suoj p noqs 
ll a& "OpXaqa "eqlad " ' ~0~ 3;lX Sq Uem rpq* pqa 
puoAaq .tq L*)!DRI)IWP mj 4pedm .r! sey q3anE aspctns 
:5'56[ 30 "mtUns at$! p! &1! 
-IW~ aw-o%-j~=aq wuaf) atp ~tr ~namaams 3yuado 
qq u~oquaq ampp~d Lq apem FEM-+OZ~ ,,sags 
do,, axp SE uouq mae~+qesodoad jo 13s puom au 
TR'SiDKOj PAW JO rflr 30 ZV -1QJ pUE1 hf~p $0 UOfr 
-.enlr;lsum onodmep oor q uayl 3ttyl q oa aas 03 aq j~qs sod 
aqA +sanu)xpJae nj pue skerurq@q xoaaou mu uo 
a~ b~od aB-I ra sld 1onuo3 %pacf!aas jo 
spq B uo 'pmum maais aqa 30 haam qa no qqqmsa 
There appeared to be at the Geneva slamnit meeting gen- 
d agreement on the need to reducc international teasion. 
The United States .position was emphatic that inspection 
wag the way to accomplish thb. The Soriet Union, in spite 
of the importance given to inspection in its 10 May pro- 
posals, emphasized rather that an all-European system of 
collective security ~vould reduce tension Pending an agree- 
ment on arms reduction and prohibition of atomic wgilpons 
and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe, Premier 
Bulganin called for a moratorium on further increases in 
the armed forces of r i r k  the NATO or the Warsaw Pact 
powers. Unquestionably this Soviet m p M m  was prompted 
by the e n y  of the Federal Republic of Germany into the 
Atlantic Alliance only a little over two months before. Prime 
Minister Eden offered a plan that would, in a limited pilot 
area, combine the United States emphasis on inspection and 
the Soviet concern with troop withdrawal. H e  suggested that 
we should consider whether we cannot set up a simple, joint in- 
spection of the forces now eonfronting one another in Europe. 
It should not be impowibIe to decide that over a spedfied area 
to be agreed between w, extending haps a fixed d th on r 3 either side of the line which now divi es East and West urope, 
there should be supervision by inspecting teae*, appointed by 
the military commands on both sides' 
No specific agreements materialized from the Geneva meet- 
ing. 
After the summit conference of 1955, the dkmmment 
discussions tmk a new turn. The Western powerrs empha- 
sited that comprehensive disarmament was unattainable 
since there was no way of controlling the elimination of 
stockpiles of atomic weapons. Said Mr. Stassen at the third 
session of the Sub-Committee: "The advances in modern 
armaments, including nuclear weapons, have been so signi- 
ficant that much of the earlier discussions of the inspection 
and control problems m y  well be ou~naded."~ On 6 Sep 
wspceEh at 21 July 1955. Etcproduced In ibid, D-18, p. 10EI. 
23 Repduccd In ibid., D-15, p. I#. 
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t a n k  1955, therefore, the Unitcd States placed a mema- 
tion on all of its pre-Geneva disarmament propwth. 'While 
not txplicitly disavowing it8 pre-l[;eneva p i t iom,  the UI6- 
td States representative d e  it dear that his government 
was not r e a h i n g  them either. The USSR, for its part, 
continued to press for the B u l p i n  p h ,  which was a re 
statement of its 10 May 1955 propals. 
When the issue came before the tenth General Assembly 
there was general rerognition of the need Eor some sort oE 
confidence-building measures. The Assembly d d  upon 
the Diaarmammt SubCommitcee to give priority to reaching 
agreement on "tangible" measures of disarmament., auch as 
the United States plan for exchanging military blueprints 
and for mutual aerial inspection and the Soviet plan for 
cstablisbing eontrol p t s  at strategic centers. The USSR 
opposed the resolution on the ground that it called for con- , trol measures without any disarmament measures. 
The fourth and fifth sessions of the Disarmament Sub- 
committee, covering the pears 1956-1957, were the most 
intensive and serious periods of general disarmament n e p  
tiations since the war. Certainly they witnessed a wide varf 
ety of proprwafs offered by all five powers, and at times a 
definite narrowing of points at issue could be observed on 
isolated questions. But this period warp also one of canfusion 
and aimlessness on the part of the negotiators. Weapons 
testing was proceeding at a furious rate, and almost every 
day seemed to foreshadow new developments in arms tech- 
nology. The principal difficulty centered around agreement 
on control measures to supervise any disarmament program 
and on what subjects were the k t  for a start on disanna- 
In term of the scope of discussions, the h t  two years of 
work in the Sub-mitt- were characterized by widc- 
,ranging proposals. Each of the five pow= offered outline 
p@ covering first-step mmurerr in lthe four chief area 
ent: reduction of conventional arm and force, 
prohibition of nuclear weapons, meadura to guard against 
surprise atrack# and cstabllishment of a control md b p  
tion q s t e m  to gwantcle o m e  af any a-cnt. All 
the major Westm pmpwals intcmehtcd thee bur p b  
lems, d i n g  agreement on one contingent upon apemt~tt 
on one or more of the athm. The USSR d m t e d  be- 
gencral propods and more limited ones dealing with 
fic problems independently (e.g, regional dkxmamctlt, c t s  
sation of tests, budgetary reductions). 
The intensity of debate and variety of p p d s ,  b o w c v ~ ,  
in no measwe compensated for their failurc to aolvt the 
technological and politid problem that had frurtmtcd 
agreement in the past, No one was able to offer a ddactmy 
technical mlution-much less a political on-to the p b  
lem of guaranteeing a ban on the production of nuclear 
weapons or guaranteeing the reduction of st&. There 
remained the tactical and strategic problem of Wcstm reli- 
ance upon a world-wide system of military h a  as opposed 
to Soviet reliance upon massed armics prepared to fight in 
territories contiguous to the USSR: at what level were 
manpower and conventional. arms to be stabilized so as to 
permit a remaining over-all balance of strength? And finally, 
there was the political problem of continued mutual h d l -  
ity and suspicion, which denied the conditions necessary to 
establish a control and inspeaion system, On one isolated 
issue, a cessation of nuclear tests, some headway was made. 
This will be considered separately below. 
Proposals for a three-stage disarmament plan were a f f d  
by France and the United Kingdom on 19 Mach 1956 and 
far the first steps of a comprehensive plan by the Unitcd 
States on 3 April. A two-stage plan for conventional a r m -  
mena and for partial measures was offered by the USSR 
on 27 March. Western objections that the Soviet control 
features were inadequate were countered with Soviet 
compIaints that the West wanted control (for the purposes 
of furthering intelligence information) without genuine 
dkmament. A French h u l a ,  "neither control without 
disarmament, nor disarmament without control but, pr- 
sivcly, all the dismmment that can at present be con- 
t r o I I d m  met the problem in principle but could net be 
worked out in practice. The Soviet mution to this vicious 
circle was a beginning agreement on "partial solutions." 
Among the items mentioned by Premier Bulganin aa "'ripe" 
for first-step disarmament were agreement on a limit to 
conventional manpower and discrJntinumce of nudear 
tzsta.= 
T h e  Western pawers generally insisted upon the interrela- 
tion of all phases of clkmmnwt, though a United States 
&ah working paper o%ered in Loedon on 3 April 1956 did 
suggest two new steps that the five powers might take 
"promptly." They were (1) exchange of a lirniwd technical 
mission to analyze problems of control and inspection of 
cunventional armaments, and (2) creation of a a m a l l  demon- 
stration test s f  control and inspection including p u n d  and 
aerial survey in n limited, non-sensitive area in the United 
States and in the USSR. Furthermore, on 3 May 1956 the 
Uniued Stam warned that 
cornprehe~ive cbmamwt and drastic reductiom can only k: 
camxed out d e l y  as paralIe1 regress is made In the wlution of 
of war wou P" d be increased* L important litical issues in e world, ar o&efwiae tbe dangers 
C;onsideration of dkmament at the Gcnaal Assembly was 
essentially a holding action. Not wanting to disturb in any 
way the possibility of an agmment in the Sub-Committee, 
the eleventh k m b l p  did not endorse the proposals of 
either side. It recommended rather that prompt attention be 
given m a11 the d o u s  proposals submittd Such a recorn- 
mmclation could be accepted unanimously, 
Hapcs were high when the SubCodt tec  reconvened in 
1957 for what was to be its longeat and mast intensive ttes- 
C 
sion. Initially, debate centered around a aeries of propaah 
&cd by the USSR on 18 March and by the United States 
' 
mYwr txlm, DirmntaRwnt: R S* Guids d Bibl' 
.E#mb of the Unitad N ~ t h  (The M. Nijeott, I Y%rmh 
hrmf.r . w i n D ,  kt- 2YFEZt. IF O a W m  P-t 
Lircnlwmr* Ref- DoEol~lcnLc, D-36, P, el6, red D-37, p. S!& 
HlbU., Ddl, p. I&!5, & I¶-b, p. 1%D. 
the next day. Neither contained any f e a ~ r e s  tss~tiallp new 
except that the United State formally reiterated a propad 
for research on the peaceful use of outer space that it had 
made before the eleventh Assembly, Two major new g t s  d 
proposals were o8Eered during the year--one by the USSR on 
$0 April and the other by tbc four Western powers on 29 
August. Each set contained new items in the way a£ am- 
promise but both were tied to conditions in successive 
stages that were unacceptable to the other side. 
While general in scope, both new sets of proposals were 
offered with the idea of impltrrteating partid measures at 
first and then going on at a later date to complete, compre- 
hensive disarmament, Again the theme of "decreasing exist- 
ing tension" and restoring "a minimum of international 
confidence" was heard. The differences proved insumount 
able, however, and in the fall the Disarmament Commission 
could only report a deadlock. At that time the principal 
areas of agreement and disagreement could be s m c d  up 
as fclllows: 
h conventionaI armaments there was agreement on a firs&- 
stage 2,500,000-manpower level for the USSR and the 
United States and 650,000 far France and the United King- 
dom;* but Western insistence on progress in the settlemeat 
of political kuca as a condition Em hrther reduction was 
unatxeptablc to the USSR. There was agreement on the 
principle of txcbangc of information as a means of control, 
but disapcement on how it waa to be d e d  out. In prin- 
ciple both rides favored a suspension of nuclear tests kith 
conmob; there was no agreement on the nature and timing 
of such controk, however, and the USSR particularly 
objected to United States insistence on agreement to cease 
the production of fissionable fuel before a test ban became 
permanent. Both sides accepted rhc principle of ground and 
=The Sdct  man Intruded Chiao. The IS2 propads of 
thew- r c n ~ % d e d i t U i o I W  1 L u m n t r y o . a i t -  
mi, of ~ n i ~  ~tam timwatir politid mmihtiom 
However, it can be psrpmcd &at M ~ v c  mpmer agmcmmt -Id 
hn m ~ w i e  ~eopk*~ b& d m. 
air inspection to guard against aurprisc a t e  theg d i e a d  
on the area to be inspected. 
Once the comprehensive disarmament talks c~Ilapsed, dis- 
cussions namwed considerably in scope. For over two y m  
the Disamament Commission did not meet and there was 
no concerted discussion of comprehensive disarmament apart 
from speeches in tbe Genaal. AsemBly. Instead, two isolated 
issucs were the subject of several conferences, They involved 
measures to prevent surprise attack and cessation of the 
testing of nuclear weapons. 
The question of surprise attack was revived in the spring 
of 1958 as an aftexmath ta a Soviet charge before the Security 
Council that United States Strategic Air Command flights 
over the Arctic region threatened the security of the USSR 
During the debate United States Am-dor Henry Cabat 
M g e  introduced a proposal recommending the establish- 
m a t  of a zone of inspection over the Arctic to guard against 
surprise attacks. At about the same time, Praident Ekn-  
howler, who had long been concerned with the problem of 
"open skines," asked P d e r  Krushchev to permit a meeting 
of experts to study the "practical problems invo1ued8' ia 
such an agreement. The Soviet gommmcnt rejected the 
United States p r o p 1  in the Securiy Council but did agree 
(in July) to a meeting of experts. 
The "Conference.cd Experts for the Study of Poaible 
Meajves Which Might Be Helphrl in P r w a n g  Surprise 
Amek'" met in November and Dmmber 1958. The Western 
powers held its mandate to be strictly u c h n i d  Thc Soviet 
r'cpracntative, however, treated it as primarily a political, 
ntgotiating body. At no timc during the confmcnce was there 
P meetbe; d minds on iu basic purpwc. and the mnference 
eventually adjourned dm die. 
By far the greatest eomidcrarion since 1957 lm been given 
to the problem of a nuclear test ban. Nuclear testing k t  
bcearne an htamtianal issue in 1954, EoUowing the th- 
nudear expIosions conducted by the United Stam in i& 
P d c  Roving Grounds in March 1954. India m k d  tht 
quation in the United Nations, expressing great concern 
over the " ~ e f E e c f s "  of nuclear wrplesiom. The lerfiafl 
government asked that the Disarmament Sub-Codttec 
give special consideration to a "standstill agrettmnt" 
among the testing powers even bcEm a control system was 
devised; and it called for full publicity of "tht extent of 
desmcdve power and h o w  effects of rhesc wtapom, and 
also adequate indication of the attent of unknown but prob- 
able effects."" Asians in general became increasingly vehe- 
ment critics of nuclear weapons testing. Particular concern 
vm expressed in Japan, whose nationals had been not only 
the h t  wartime victims of an atomic attack but also the k t  
serious casualties of the testing program." The Asian-Akan 
conference held in Bandung in April 1955 appealed in its 
find cornmuniqu6 to the "powors concerned" to reach an 
agreement on suspension of testa pending an agreement 
prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons? 
During the next three years warld-wide pressure for such 
action rnomted. This was to be reflected in the intense- 
and sometimes heated4ehtes at the eleventh, twelfth, 
and thirteenth General Aiisemblies. The focus of the argu- 
ment was the possible deleterious effect upon present and 
future generations of radioactive contamination of the -05- 
phm. At the tenth Assembly, Indonesia and Syria groped 
that all nuclear weapons tests be suspended until mme was 
known about their radiation efEects. Instead of taking so 
d i e  a scand, thc h b l g  geated a fifteen-mmk per- 
manent SeienrSc Committee on h e  Effects of Atomic 
Radiation to assemble, compare, reviav, and disseminate 
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infomation on obsemed levels of dkactivi ty in the en- 
vironment and the effects of s ~ &  radiation upon man and 
his environment. 
b o n g  the nudear powers rhemsc1ves the initiative in 
=king a mt-'Ban agreement came Emm the USSR. Discan- 
tinuance of nuclear weapons tau  was included in it9 10 May 
1955 propals before the D b i w n e n t  SubCbmmittet as 
one af the first measures in a dharmamcnt program. Later* 
on 27 March 1956, the USSR d l 4  for a test cessation 
"forthwith," independently of the attainment of agreement 
on other proMems of disarmamat. Premier Bulganie, in his 
extensive correspondence with President Eisenhower during 
1956, wntinued to press for an independent agreement. On 
11 September 1956 he wrote: 
I should also like to direct your attention, Mr. President, m so 
important and pressing a problem-me which is a pan of thc 
atomic problem-aa that of discontinuing tests of atomic and 
h drogen wea as. I t  is a known fact that the discontinuation 
o I such tests 8" oa not in itself require any international contra1 
agreements, fox the present state af science and engineering 
ible to detect any explosion of an atomic or hy&e 
it may be set off. In our opinion this sima- 
tion makes it possible to wpsrrate the roblem of ending tests of 
atomic md hydmgea weapons fmm J e  *nerd bmblm, of ah- 
armament and to solve it independently even now, without tying 
an agreement on this aubject to agreements on otber dimma- 
m a t  pmblmm.g 
Premier Bulganin'9 assdon that controls to detect a test 
violation were unnecessary was flatly denied by the West. 
I Anglo-French eountcrpropls on 19 March 1956 called for 
a test cessation* under controls, only as part of the third 
stage of a comprehensive d i s a m t ~ l t  agreement. A second 
Western qdikation was added by Ambassador Lodge 
be£ort the C ; e n d  Assembly in January 1957: bcfonr: 
nwLcar test exp10~ions could cease, there would have to be 
an agreement on a cut-off, under an agreed control system, 
in production of hionable fuels for nuclear purposes. He 
defended thk requirement on the grounds that 
even il all tat  explosions were s topF,  the stockpiling of atomic 
and hydrogea weapons would conunue. If the tests were discon- 
tinued, all efforts to reduce radio-active fallout in those weapons 
would also be discontinued, and thoae being stockpiled would 
contain far larger amounts of radioactivity than they would have 
otherwise. Finally, additional nations, even without nuclear tests, 
would be manufacturing their own nuclear weapons using tech- 
niques already k n o ~ . ~  
The Western insistence on the need to continue testing until 
a cuts% agreement and a control plan were negotiated 
encountered strong criticism not only from Eastern Euro- 
pean delegates at the eleventh Assembly but from many of 
the leading neutralist nations as well. V. K. Krishna Menon, 
speaking for India, maintained that even the smallest incre- 
ment of external radiation in the atmosphere was harmful 
because it increased the mutation of genes in human repro- 
ductive organs. The United States found itself in an ever 
more uncomfortable position on this issue. Ambassador 
Lodge remarked somewhat apologetically: "We know that 
nuclear testing has given conceq to many sincere people 
throughout the world. We believe-these fears are ill founded, 
but we respect their moti~ations."~ 
Neither the United States position nor that of those who 
wanted an immediate test ban was fully supported by the 
evidence published by the Scientific Committee on the 
Effects of Atomic Radiation in mid-1958. It tended to back 
up the Western argument on the relative harmlessness of 
testing by revealing the comparatively small addition to 
radioactive materi* attributable to nuclear tests-particu- 
larly in comparison to the large amount created by the 
+cUnited N a t i o ~  G d  haembly, O f l W  Records (CAOR): 12th Se9, 
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One major obstacle was elidrrated when, on 14 June 
1957, the USSR offered for the first time to permit control 
p t s  on its tmitary to suptmk a tar cessation. Following 
the W e t  announcement of a provisional unilatml ccsisa- 
tion in March 1958, the United States found itself under 
considerable pressure to negotiate a test ban without await- 
ing agreement on a cut-off in h$bnable fuel producti~n. 
Prmident Eisenh0w.a then proped to Premier Khruahchev 
the mwocation of a p u p  of &team and Western experts 
to study the specific mntrol measures. Premier Khlrushchev 
agreed, and the errsluing conference concluded that it was 
"technically feasible to cstnblisb . . . a workable and effective 
control system to detect violations of an agreement on the 
worldwide suapeesion of nudear weapons tests.'Y1 The fid 
report described the scientific and technical requirememu 
fw# wch a system. The problems and prospects of the second, 
morc political, conference %@ill be evaluated in a later 
chapter* 
Tbe year 1959 thus found adwe dLsmummr nqptiati~ns 
bcjAg c m i &  out in on47 one Wtcd phare of the whole 
p b k m  Same amsideration to tht wcrsll p M e m  w a  
gi~rtl by the GcnePP fanilpr ministcrs"eting in the early 
=lt in m a g m m r ~ ~ ~ t  'to refu- 
anr in the ten-naticm cilarmnittee 
v, toa, in t h e  Camp David tnllur in -brr 
disa?mament, thagh the diallls of && 
b - h m  haw nm yet been rtwaled. 
- That there is a universal popular desire for aomt brcalt in 
the intensity ob the current anxu race is beyond qumtioI1'. 
Tht nu- &bated) related to cbrmamcnt in the four- 
teenth Gu14 Assembly and the severat important p r o p  
sals put f m w d  in this world-wide setting are sufficient 
witness to &is fact. But even intense popular desire docs not 
guarantee serious cornideration of a viable agreement. The 
old problems-political and technoIogical-remain. They 
will be considered in the follawing chapters, before an aaisess- 
meet of the current digarmament picture is attempted. 
The Problem of Confro1 
IN SUBSTANCE the conemporary problem of disarmament is a 
pxobIem of control to ensure that agreement will not Wvertly 
be violated. The United States insists that it will a c p t  no 
disarmament agreement that is not a controlled one. Behind 
this h a n d  lies che fear that a~:uycontroIlcd disarrnarnent 
apernent wiIl full the dem&mtic nations of the Westere 
coalition into a false sense of security; that the USSR will 
maintain a strong military posture while the West reduce 
i ts  strength; and that the USSR, in the absence of a military 
deterrent, will ultimately expand its iduence by aggressive 
means. Furthermore, there is the 'belief that an uncontro1led 
agreement may promote suspicions of violatiom which in 
turn could lead to recriminations g d  an increase instead of 
a deaease in intfnnatimaI q m m .  
Control, in short, is to he &s&$titute for the mutual urwt 
that is lacking among the'-siptasics. This leads to the 
fundamental dilemma of modem disarmament: amawl L 
demanded as a substitute for mutual trust;. yet a high d e p x  
of mutual confidence is neccssay before a control plan can 
be put into effect. Modern history prbvides' very little guid- 
ance for solving this dilemma. W l c  disarmament negotia- 
tions have a lengthy history, the number of cornurnmated 
agreements is YW small. And in no case has a heely negoti- 
ated disarmament agreement included a control system to 
guarantee its observance. 
This analysis suggests that control is principally a politi- 
cal prob1cm. It is not enough that the major powen be 
agreed on the short-run political status quo to achieve a dis- 
armament agreement; there must be a more basic longer-run 
understanding on each side that the international ordm 9s it 
exists is going to endure. Peaceful coexistence must mean 
mc3re thm a propagandistic slogan: it must involve an ac- 
howledgment of the legitimate right of all nations and social 
system to exist. Otherwise the egtablishmcnt of an adequate 
control system is extremely doubtful, if not impossible. 
The major problem centers around the attitudes and out- 
loak of the Soviet Union. In h e  last analysis any conaol 
agreement must be fully reciprocal. T h e  USSR must accept 
the same limitations on its national sovereignty that tbe 
Western powers are willing to accept. It must look upon a 
controlled disarmament plan as offering more over-an s e a =  
rity than is offered by its awn military establishment, 
Furthermore, its scientists and technicians must agree with 
those of the West on the specific requisites of the control 
riystern. As we shall see, neither Soviet ideology nor the 
statements and behavior of Soviet negotiators indicate that 
it does look upon control in this light. 
In view of the preoccupation that both sides, the West in 
particular, have had with the concept of control, it is per- 
haps surprising to note how limited the negotiations on an 
actual control plan have been. Tbe negotiations over the 
past fourteen years have really been preliminary skirmishes. 
Most of the speeches, debates, and propals  have concerned 
general aims, bases for future discussions, and the like. 
En only three instances at most cam it be said that the 
major powers got down to serious discussion of a control 
plan. The first took place during 1946 in the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission, where the details of a plan to 
control the world's production of atomic energy were 
wrestled with. Twelve years later represenrativ& from the 
East and West met in Geneva m consider the technical 
means of preventing surprise attack. (In view of the basic 
Iack of agreement on the c~nference's terms a£ reference, 
one might omit even this as an instance of serious discus- 
sion. Finally, there are the two Geneva conferences to devise 
a control system for prohibiting nuclear tests. A brief review 
of the Soviet reaction to s p d f k  mntrol plans illustrates the 
nature and extent of Soviet opposition to any control. 
In the Baruch Plan, the USSR was confronted with the 
mwt far-reaching type of conml plan possible. Its purpose 
was to guarantee that atomic energy would be used for 
peaceful purposes only. The  means proposed was interna- 
tionalization of alI  facilities producing fissionable fuel, in- 
cluding plants and reactors supplying energy for peaceful 
purposes as well as for atomic bomb, because "there is an 
inrimate relation between the activities required for peace- 
ful purposes and those leading to the production ol atomic 
~ e a p o n s . " ~  In addition to ownership of all Fissionable mate- 
rials and production facilities, Mr. Baruch's Atomic Develop 
ment Authority would have had complete inspection, 
accounting, and licensing powers."' 
In principle the USSR also called for international con- 
trol of atomic energy. But the Baruch Plan was totally unac- 
ceptable. The USSR insisted upon national ownaship and 
management of atomic energy facilities, accepting, at the 
most, international inspection of these facilities. In 1946 
internationalization of aII atomic energy production would 
have involved a greater sacrifice for the United States, which 
I then possessed such facilities, than Eor the USSR, which did 
I not. Why was the latter so adamantly opposed? Principally, 
1 it would appear, because it feared that the plan would tend 
m preserve the United States monopoly of atomic weapons. 
1 Moreover, the USSR did not vusr the operations of an inter- 
national controI authority that would regulate an atomic 
I industry once one had been established in the Soviet Union, 
T h e  Russians could not conceive of an international board 
in which they were a minority without a right of veto that 
muld distribute the benefits of atomic technology as fairly 
to the USSR as it would to the non-Communist nations of 
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the W e s ~  htirei Gmmyko m i n d  no words in getting to 
the heart of the Soviet objectian: 
ft ia easy to understand that the granting of such righa to aun- 
troll organs would mean a complete arbitrariness a£ these organs 
aod, first of all, of those who would be in a pasirion to command 
a majorit in these OF. . . The Soviet Union is aware thnt 
there w' d be a majmty in the mnml organ which m y  take 
one-sided decisions, a rna'ority on whose benevolent attitude to- 
w d  a e  ~ o v i n  union the swiet people Qinnot count. ~ h -  
fane, the Soviet Unian, and probab y not d y  rhe Soviet Union, 
-not allow that the fate of iu national er:momp be h d c d  
cwer to this arganu 
Control of a different sort waa d i d  in 1958, when 
the two sides met to study measures concerning protcction 
against surprise attack. Western experts presented detailed 
scientific and tdnieat infmmatian describing posgiblc 
means of surveillance and observation to prevent a potential 
surprise attack by missiles, ainr;rft, naval d t ,  and ground 
forces. Ammg the techniqua that the Weatern powers saw 
as p i b l e  wtrc aerial photography, radar, electronic recon- 
naissance, idha-red techniques, the use of ground forces, 
and acoustic, magnetic* and pressure techniques for under- 
water detection. In describing a " p i b l e  system*' of detec- 
tion against surprise attack by aircraft, the West suggested 
the necessity of a rather extensive petration into the 
domestic activities of the controlled states. For example, at 
almost all major airfields used by long-range aircraft thae 
would have to be ground observers who might even have to 
ohme the takc-off and landing of all such aircraft, so that 
the exact number of planes airborne at any time as we11 aa 
the length of time each individual craft had been in the air 
couId b bowam 
These technical questiom were never considered gcriouslp 
by the IJSSR V. V. Kunetsov charged on the last day of the 
conferc~lce that 
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during the come of our labour& h e  the Western reprsmta- 
tives obstinately attempted to dra the Coderence into a con- 
sideration of nothing but C O R ~  f questions, a control whose 
obvious purpose was to get as much military infarmation as p 
sible about the newest weapons such as, for example, long dIs- 
tance rockets.* 
Neverthelm, the Soviet representatives did o& a series of 
prop& that contained control features. Some of these 
featwes paralleled the Western suggestions, although taken 
as a whole they clearly reveal the suspicion and distrust the 
USSR has always manifested regarding comprehensive con- 
ml arrangements. It did agree to the establishment of 
ground control posts at railroad junctions, major ports, and 
on main mads. It also called far the estabIishment of aerial 
photography zones in Europe, Asia, and the United States. 
But even these features were M e d  to political mnditionr 
that the West could not accept, such as a omthird redutction 
of troops in Europe and a prohibition of nudear weapons 
and missiles on German territory. 
In describing the scope of control againat surprise attack 
the Soviet government noted that "the main principle" 
underlying any ground contpl operations or aerial photog- 
raphy should be "respect far the fuU mereign rights d 
countries on whose territoria ground control posts and aerial 
photogt-sphy wiLP be e~tablis$ed.''~ Its plan for ground 
inspection fully mnformexl to this principle. For example, 
the number of control offioervl at earth post could not exceed 
fom, of whom half had to be nationals of Sbe country being 
o h d .  A maximum of six posts were to be establkbed in 
the USSR, which meant that at the most twelve nonSoviet 
c~ntrol affkms would be respansible far &eking an tht I movemenu cd all land forces in the territory of the USSR. 
In addition, the pwt m d e r  would be a citizen of the 
satebeing controlled, as would all auxiliary pemomc1. Thc 
conference adjourned, howewr, without giving d o u s  can- 
- .  sideradon to specific p~llpogala 
I I
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Supam?hbg o T& Ban 
On the question of establishing a mnml system to over- 
see a nuclear test ban, as least the first hurdle has been sur- 
mounted. Except for the question of underground e x p b  
rsiom, there is general agreement on the technical requisites 
for  controI1ing a tat ban. But developments at the second 
Geneva conference indicate that Soviet opposition to a genu- 
ine control system has not yet been overcume. 
At the first technid conference, a network of approxi- 
mately 180 fixed control posts was recommended. Ten of 
them would be on ships, and from 169 to 170 would be land- 
based throughout the world as £allows: North America, 24; 
Europe, 6; Asia, 57; Australia, 7; South America, 16; Africa, 
16; Antarctica, 4: and 60 on various islands. T h a e  control 
stations would be so equipped that they could detect a 
nuclear explosion mywhere in the world. An estimated 
thirty specialists, in addition to an auxiliary servicing staff, 
would be required for each post. Furthermore, the control 
system would include air sampling by aircraft carrying out 
regular Bights along north-south routes over the weans. 
Underground explosions of low kibtm-yield posed a spe  
cia1 problem bemuse their signals, as recorded on seismic 
instruments, closely resemble the signals auwd by earth- 
quakes. Thus provision was made for dispatching onsite 
inspection teams to those areas where seismic signals could 
not clearly distinguish an earthquake from a v i b t  nuclear 
test. An international control organ would supervise and 
coordinate this whole system. 
But several problem remain to be solved. For example, 
what exactly is to be the camposition and authority of the 
central control board? By what vote are the various kin& ot 
decisions to be taken? Who shall man the concrot posts? 
What criteria are to determine how many on-site inspections 
arc to be made? What specific data shall be taken into 
account in developing these criteria? These are among the 
principal questions now under consideration in Geneva. 
There L agreement that the intcrnatioaal oontrol mm- 
mission should have seven memhas. The USSR, the Ud- 
ted Kingdom, and the United Statm, aa pemmemt ~~ 
would elect four other nations to serve on a rotating 
But agreement b lacking on who the four non-permanent 
members should be as well as on the voting procedure d the 
oogunission as a whoIe. Until late k t  year the USSR insisted 
I 
that the permanent members have a veto on such vital qua- 
tions as policing (including the decision to &patch on-site 
inspection tams) and on BBml and budgetary m m  Thc 
application of a vem by the permanent members on the 
control commission would, in Western eyes, cripple the 
whole system of controk automatic and prompt inspection 
of any explosion suspected of being nuclear is considered to 
be a vital element of the whole plan; an inadequate sptem 
of financing the control commission's options could also 
r e  the ~;ommision's work. Tbc USSR's general dcfcmt of 
the veto power is that the Western powem will have an 
"automatic majority" on questions involving the Soviet 
national interest. France's forthcoming entry into rhe 
nuclear club is likely to exacerbate this fear. 
Two Soviet c a m p &  have been o h t d  as a way out 
of the R n p .  Premier Kbrushchev last spring publidg 
approved Prime Minister M a w s  suggestion for ad- 
vance agreement on a specified number of muat  veto-& 
uri-arite inspections. Currendy under conaideration is the 
exact number of such inspectiora A marc sweeping p r o p  
sal to eliminate the veto wtirelg was made last December. 
The USSR agreed to perrnit all mhtantiw decisions to be 
made by a two-thirds vote oE the commhion 5f, inter rrrllo, 
the four non-pmnment members were to include two reprc 
satativles from Warsaw Pact nations, one from the NATO 
aounaits, a d  one neutral, thUg giving the USSR and im 
dies their long mught-after "parity" of repmentation. As 
of now thc Western powers are adhering: to their position 
that tht mn-permanent membaa of the control lxlmmiarian 
&odd include representative from one Wmtcm nation, 
onc Sovict ally, d two neutral nationsI thus ~mblishhg 
ail 
an over-all representation of three far the West and two for 
the East, plus the two neutrals. 
Closcly r e l a d  is the problem of how to select the teams 
for on-site inspection and what authority they art to have. 
The Western powers want trained, permanent mobile in- 
spection teams ready to hvacigatc at a moment's notice. 
The USSR har insisted that the team could act only in con- 
sultation with the government on whose territory the inyesti- 
gation takes place. They would presumably be c o m p e d  of 
nationals born the nation under inspection accompanied by 
"foreign specialists" from the other side, ks the USSR sees 
it, without such limitations the inspection teams would have 
license. to roam indiscriminately for =pionage purposes. 
Also under contention is the cornpition of the person- 
nel of the permanent control posts* As noted, she general 
Soviet position has been that this perswnel should be pri- 
marily indigenous, with the inclusion of a specified number 
of 'Toreipers." The USSR has agreed to as m y  as ten 
foreignem out of the suggested total oE thirty per pt. In 
the Western view, Russians inspecting the Soviet Union, 
Americans the United States, Frenchmen France, and so 
forth, is tantamount to self-inspection and violates the basic 
purpose of a control system. The United States and the 
United Kingdom have been working on s compromise 
whereby Soviet nationals would comprise that third of the 
total complement which is devoted to sewicing and, in addi- 
tion, approximately a third of the te&ni-l positions, in 
pts within Soviet borders. But they insist that in thest 
pasts all suQervisory positions be uccupied by Wtsterners 
and that the remaining technical positions be filIed by 
British, United Stam, and "third party" nationals. Natural- 
ly, a reciprocal m g e m e n t  would be made far the mtrol 
posts in the United States and United Kingdom. 
Last December the %Get representative at Geneva agreed 
to accept the Western compromise plan for stding of the 
control pasts if in turn the West would accede to the Soviet 
demand for parlty on the seven-nation control commission. 
Barstc Sooiec Fe5rn 
A recurring theme runs through all Soviet positions: 
Soviet distrust of majority voting in any control group. In 
the three instances where a control system has been consid- 
eTed in aome detail, Soviet representatives hare insisted 
either upon parity of representation between East and W e t  
or on the right of veto in the contemplated international 
control organ. In the last analysis they have refused to be 
bound on any question involving a vital national interest. 
Both the development of a domestic atomic energy industry 
and the maintenance of a military establishment immune 
from foreign scrutiny fall in the category of vital national 
interests* 
Under present circumstances, any international control 
group reflecting the realities of political power would inevit- 
ably include a majority of non-Communist nations. Deei- 
$ions involving actual and potential interests vital to the 
USSR would have to be made continuously by a control 
board the majority of whose members would represent social 
and economic systems the USSR considers inherently hostile. 
Any conflicts would ultimately have to be resolved by repre- 
sentatives of governments, and it is assumed that on all 
major decisions the capitalist nations would vote as a bloc. 
In Soviet eyes, the basic economic and politid conflict 
today is between the Soviet and the capitalist systems, which 
are felt to be irreconcilably o p p e d .  In the USSR's view, 
there is no permanent middle ground between the two, nos 
is it p i b l e  Ear "neutral" representatives to arbitrate politi- 
cal and economic conflicts between them. ~ X M ,  fgr the 
Soviet Union, representation on a control board along the 
k e s  proposed by the West would be inherently inequitable 
k u s e  the capitalist nations and their allies would have 
several times as many votes as the Communist nations. 
Repeatedly, Soviet representatives have brought up 
charges of p i b l e  bad faith on the part of a contra1 agency 
Typical was thc quation asked by Andmi Vyshinsky before 
a General Asscmbly meeting: 
If it was admawledged, as the supporters of the United Stam 
lan did acknowledge, that evidence of bad faith might W b l  & given by the govammno, why not abowkdge b a t  ru Ji 
bad faith might equally well be shown by the staff of the control 
agency in its adrmnisuationW 
Quest io~~ of good and bad faith are, to the USSR, related to 
political judgment, not to moral character or personality, 
The Soviet leadership has evinced extreme doubt that repre- 
mtatives of communism and capitalism can be neutral on 
important political questions. Prauda, for example, gave as 
one of the masons for Soviet rejection of the United Nations 
plan for international control of atomic energy the argument 
that it would be impossible to find '"independent people" to 
run the control agency.m This disbelief in the possibility of 
impartiaIity of states or statesmen when questions of differ- 
/g economic and social ~ystems are involved has been a 
constant feature sf Soviet foreign policy. 
The 'Garnesrnanrhipa of Negotiations 
IT xs EASXER to i iCCOUM f ix  the inability of the major powers 
to reach a disarmament agreement than for the tenacity with 
which negatiatians have been carried on over the p t  four- 
teen years. United States insistence upon a ayJtem of control 
and Soviet resistance to it loom as the principal reason why 
all disarmafnent efforts to date have p m  abortive. Arms, 
after all, remain one of the principal means by which na- 
tional security is maintained. A government can afford to 
let down its defenses in the face of a threatening p w a  only 
at its own pwil. Disarmament effom mmt of neceasit~ evoke 
the most conservative responses from those responsible for a 
nation's safety. 
This analysis operates on the assumption that a r m  races 
are mom a product than a muse of international tension, 
Admittedly there is a circular effect: Nation A in fear of 
nation B increases its armaments. Nation B, in colllsequence, 
intensifies its military build-up lest it fall behind nation A. 
This adds to nation A's insecurity and a counter-build-up 
rakes place. And so build-up is added to build-up. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for a disammmt agree- 
ment 39 the need to break this vicious circle. Why not, it 
is argued, let disarmament be the lq4nniug of a reduction 
in international tension? This argument would be more 
easily sustained if it were possible to measure exactly the 
military capabilities and intentions of all nations w that 
m e  fosm of parity or quity of military h c c  could be 
established But one nation's security may, unfortunately, 
be another's hecuriq. T h e  history of both inter-- and 
pt-war digarm;rment efforts; pfoves the near impossibilitp 
of thb task. There arc too many immtaaurable Eactors. What 
criteria of nationd size are to be used to gauge thc p p c r  
strgngth of an army: land mass, population, industrial capa- 
city, gross national product, overseas possessions? What 
weight is to be given national animosities and maditiond 
historical fears? In the words of behaviorists, how precisely 
c m  "threat pexception'9be measured? 
Another set of problems plagues the proponents of dis- 
armament-ta-reduce-tension. How can different military in- 
struments be compared? What, for example, is the man- 
power equivalent of a missile m e d  with a nuclear war- 
head? Are domestic police or trained reservists to be consid- 
ered part of a nation's arrny? These and similar questions 
have been stuclied earnestly by many authorities without 
satisfactory answers. It follows that the only possible way to 
produce a genuine, entirely stisfactory disarmament agree- 
ment is to eliminate or mitigate the political mdlicts giv- 
ing rise to the tension. It is more than likely that this would 
lead to unilateral disarmament without any agreement. The 
prognosis for a comprehensive disarmament agreement 
while the cold war lasts is not very good. 
What, &en, accounts for tbe persistence of these negotia- 
tions? Are policy makers so blinded by their own words 
that they have failed to see the real difficuIties and operate 
under some form of self-delusion? Or. worse yet, have the 
leaders of the major powers been engaged in a coldly cyniml 
game of deluding domestic and intenantiom1 public opinion? 
Neither hypothesis accords with the faas. 
No simple hypothesis mn explain something sa complex 
as these negotiations carried on over a period of fourteen 
years by several nations governed by many different adminis- 
trations and leaders. T h e  complexity of the subject is under- 
scored by the facts of the rapidly changing technologp of 
weapons, the shifts in i n m i t y  of the cold war, the growing 
importance of independent Asian and African countries, the 
changing political complexion of the United Nations, and 
the different expectations and aspirations of dite groups and 
leadem throughout tht world. Nevertheless, in spite of these 
&anga, certain generalizations about disarmament do 
ancrgc. It irr poaribk to observe in all the ebb aud ibw of 
negotiations, throughout the periods of total dtadlodc a d  
near agreement, a pattern that at 1-c p d & y  accounts Ear 
much of the content of the propads. 
T ,.Forem~)~t among the haam that exptain the pedstmcc 
-of the negotiaticm is public opinion. From the moment of 
Himahha, the h m t  of a future war i n v o l ~ g  use of the 
atomic weapons was made clear* and the demand that atomic 
weapons never again be used haa persisted arnong peoples 
throughout the world. Part of this demand ha, of course, 
bccn an outay apinst war itself. A weariness with war and 
armed confiict was a natural and inevitable reaction to the 
titanic struggle between the Allies and the Axii. In August 
1945, following Japan'ls stmender, demobilization and dis- 
armament, along with restmarion of peacetime eronomiw, 
were principal national objectivm. The ration against 
atomic weapons found expression in the speeches made 
before the first General Assembly and in the unanimous vote 
creating the Atomic En= Commission. Later that year 
the Assembly, again unanimously, produced a str of prim 
dples governing; the general regulation and reduction of 
armaments.47 So impressed were many with this achievement 
that the Asmnbly sessiun was referred to at the time as the 
"'dissumament Assembly." Since then disarmaunent has been 
~~)ntinuously on the Assembly's agenda 
The feeling of urgency about reducing and regulating 
armaments, parSicu1arly nudear weapons, gradually sub- 
sided as the hmtilitiwr of the cold war deepened, only to be 
mamused by the successful testinga of the hydrogen bomb 
by the United Stata  and the USSR in 1952 and 1953, respec- 
t i dyC  To the awesome power of the A-bomb was added the 
thcomicat~ly unlimited destructiveness of the H-bomb. Prime 
Minister Nehm pointedly warned &e major powen that 
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the world did not look with indifference upon the nuclear 
arms race: 
These ate horrible prospects and a$ea us nations and poplerr 
everywhere, whether we are involved in wars or power b1oa or 
not. . . . There can be little doubt about the deep and wide- 
s read concern in the world, articulariy among peoples, about 
t ! ese weapons and their drea B ful c~nsequences.~ 
Fuel was added to the fire of public indignation by the prob 
lem of atomic radiation. India first raised the question in 
April I954 before the Disarmament Commission. A month 
later the Trusteeship Council received a petition from the 
"MarshaIIese Congress Hold-Over Committee" expressing 
alarm a t  the increasing danger horn United States tests in 
the Truss Territory of the Marshall Islands. Since then the 
question oE the potentially harmful effects of the tests upon 
a11 peoples has been a regular-and at times extremely erne 
tional-issue before the General Assembly. The most recent 
Assembly expressed "the profound concern evinced by the 
peoples of all countries regarding the testing of nuclear and 
themanuclear weapons" and requested states to refrain 
from testing.+# 
General Assembly res~lutions are not, of course, legally 
binding, Their political and moral influence can neverthe- 
less be great. Every government vigorously seeks to obtain 
United Nations approval of any of its policies that m a y  be 
under consideration. A n~otion of censure, condemnation, or 
even disapproval against a nation's poIicy is, if nothing else, 
a serious propaganda defeat. For the United States and the 
USSR this is all the more true because each is engaged in a 
global campaign to win allegiance and support. As a reflector 
of world opinion the United Nations is imperfect; it repre- 
sents governments, not peoples. But its actions come nearer 
to representing world consensus than any other instrument 
that exists. 
Because of the appeal that disarmament has for world 
public opinion, negotiations have inevitably become in- 
a Extracts of spcecb. @. t i t . ,  US Docurnen&, pp. 247-249. 
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voW in the propaganda warfare between the USSR and 
the Western powers, The purples of propaganda have vir- 
tually dominated all negotiations to date, with the possible 
exception of those involving cessation of nudeax tests. This 
is not to deny the sincerity of some efforts to reach agree- 
ment. But sincerity of purpose i9 no solvent for the hard 
realities that have stood in the way of an agreement. As these 
realities have become apparent, each side has used the nego- 
tiations to discredit the other and put upon it the onus for 
failure so reach an agreement. Each side bas sought to p r -  
bay its own proposals as fully reasonable and those of the 
other as unworkab2e or unfair. 
In effect, t-bamament negotiiatiom t h ~ t l v e s  have bp 
00m.c a weapon in the eold wax. Speeches made in m d  
#ion, committee, and plenary Assembly have mote often k n  
designed m influence different segments of opinion &an to 
ma& an aeo-odatian with the other nations represented 
at the conference table. Both East and West have beoolne 
masters at the art of appealing directly ta peoples over the 
h a 6  of their panments. 
Soviet pliq in negoxiating international contml of 
atomic energy c~emplified this new kind of dipl~macy~ T h e  
hviet altcmatira to the Barueh Plan, typified by tht St&- 
h a h  "peace pldge*'tu "ban the bomb," wert too esrtrem;t 
to bc mmidercd seriaus1y even by the Sariet Unioa Their 
p w p e  wag to ide11t;fy Soviet polieg with the same ultimate 
@--elimination of the atomic bomb-without d i n g  thc 
red sacrifice necessary to achieve that -1, Soviet resolutions 
and speecha were designed to atate actitndes, to convey 
and reiterate the theme that the Saviet Union stocrd for thc 
absolute prohibition d a t d  weapons and that the United 
&am refusal ta renounce the bomb p v e d  the aggressive 
nature af its foreign policy. 
One of the important features of the wag Saviet d h m a -  
ment policy in the United NatioAa was d 6 d  out warr the 
g e n d  uniformity of presentation before dl the various 
organs where the subject wa9 debated. f n general, there was 
no significant dikfertotiation in the content md tone of 
50viet speeches in United Nations M a  according to the 
particular functions of the General Assembly and its com- 
mittees, the Security Council, the Atomic Energy Commis- 
sion, or the Disarmament Commission. The wual procedure 
was for the Soviet representatives to present, with few exccp 
tions, the same kind of long, tendentious, and hostile 
speeches before every body, large and small. 
Beginning with the propmala for international control of 
atomic energy, both sides have developed and refined the 
technique of utilizing the discussions for propaganda pur- 
~ e s .  This might be described as the "gamesmanship" of 
disarmament negotiations. A cardjnal feature of this "game" 
has been to reject the proposals of the other side without 
appearing to sabotage the discussions. 
Evwp plan offered by either side has contained a set of 
proposals calculated to have wide pupuIar appeal. Every 
such set has included at least one feature that the other side 
could not possibly accept, thus Eorcing a rejection. Then the 
proposing side ha3 been able to claim that the rejector is 
opyed  to the idea of disarmament in toto. T h e  objection- 
". able feature m a p  bc thought of a the "joker" in every series 
of P P ~  
This tactic accounts far the paradox that, over tbe past 
fourteen years, the two sides have appeared to be m w h g  
their differences on some issues even though fundamental 
differences have prevented them b m  cons-ting an 
agreement The proposals were never meant to be considered 
in isolation, If the negotiators could afford to come closer at 
times, it waj only because a joker that had outlived itsr use- 
fulness had been discarded; meanwhile, a new one was being 
inaduced that would again make overall agreement i m p  
rib1r. Some of the jokers, of course, m a y  have been intend& 
as bargaining points. Others may have been rdectkms of 
hcompIetely resolved conflicts within the bureaucracies of 
the groping governments. The faet remainsI however, &at 
they m e d  to prevent agreement. This  pattern iar clearly 
more evident in the case of the Soviet pmgwals than in those 
of Britain, France, or the United States becaw Soviet o p p  
sition to mat aspects of general dimmament (with mntrob) 
is &ream than that fif the West. 
A detailed review of all the p r o p h  in order to o-e 
&ir. pattern is yupawible j r~  a summar), analysis rmch as 
*IS. Th~re  examples will ~ l a r f 3 b x  (1) international OMI~XT,~ 
d.atomrc, en-* (2; the problem of limiting armed man- 
' '  p e r  &$ (3) the of a nuclear test asmti011. 
L 
For reasons outlined earlier, the Baruch proposals for in- 
texnationa1 control of atomic energy wene anathema to the 
USSR. They nevertheless confronted Soviet foreign policy 
with a very d o u s  cbdlenge in terms of world opinion. In 
one fell swoop the United States pro@ striking at tht 
m t  of national sovereignty and hrwa eliminating the ' mawe atomic warfare, it not global conflict, 
Seemingly, there were only three alternativa open to the 
Soviet government: to h e p t  the Western plan, reject it, or 
p r p p  a more viable akmativd But since none a£ t h e  
cholcm fully s$tdaSaviet n d ,  another way was hund that 
had 7 poIitical logic rif its o m .  The Soviet gomxtieat 
demanded an immediate and unconditiona1 prohibition of 
the production and we of atomic weapons. In e&ct it asked 
the United States m abandon the bomb without asswane 
that the USSR itself would hot secretly build one. (Nor, for 
tbat matter, would the Soviet Union have bem assured a£ 
United States good faith.) Prohibition d atomic weapons 
without a workable control sptem to ensure Soviet mmpli- 
8 1 ~ : ~  muld nwer have been accepted by the United States, 
as the Kremlin was well aware, This sine qcur non of all 
M e t  prop& on the subject was the propagandistic jolter. 
It is un-, far our purposes, to chdIenge the sin- 
d t y  of the Baruch Plan. If adopted, it wauld have M T V ~  
the United States national interat well. It wculd have for- 
m 
ever precluded the USSR from carrying out the research 
necessary to produce the bomb; and the United States would 
always have been able to preserve the knowledge of the tech- 
nical requirements for production-just in case. It may be 
questioned, however, whether the United States Congress 
would in fact have gone along with the plan had the Russians 
accepted it. 
As it was, the Baruch Plan, too, contained a joker: United 
States insistence that the permanent members of the Security 
Council abandon the veto where questions of sanctions 
against the violators of the control agreement were raised. 
This demand may have been not so much a joker as a bar- 
gaining point to be dropped if the USSR accepted all other 
features of the plan, but the United States never did offer to 
abandon it. Soviet resistance to any tampering with the 
veto was well known. Elimination of the veto was neither 
an original feature of the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan (the pre- 
cursor of the Baruch Plan) nos a vita1 element of the control 
system. If the USSR had accepted this plan (and while it is 
now clmr &at the idea of ~ntenzational ownership of dl 
atomic facilities was totaIly repugnant to the Russians, that 
could not be assumed in the mid-forties), there would have 
been no need for eliminating the veto ta punish a violator. 
The Western powers, under Article 51 of the Charter re- 
garding the "inherent right of individual or collective self- 
defense." could have taken the necessary action on their own, 
although the veto might, of course, have made it impossible 
to obtain the moral support of a Security Council resolution. 
On the question of determining an agreed maximum for 
the armed forces of the major powers, the Soviet p r o p a h  
were more subtle but equally impossible of acceptance by 
the West. Manpower limits have not been the subject of 
active debate since the Disarmament Sub-Committee sessions 
of 1957, but future consideration of a comprehensive plan 
wilI inevitably re-activate this question. Any reduction of 
armed forces must be carried out in such a way that no 
country's over-all military strength is reduced proportion- 
ately more than any orher nation's. ?'he problem is knotty 
I. b u s e  of the difEculty of establishing a military equivalent 
of a given quantity of men arid other fighting units, such as 
ships, aircraft, tarh, and cannon. Determined efforts in the 
inrer-war period to establish such an equivalent £ailed 
m the post-wmrd Wax I1 period this problem h been 
i complicated by two basic ham. First, the USSR has main- tained a considerab1y larger army than has the United Stam. To compensate far this the United Stam has concentrated on the development and stockpiling of atomic and nudear weapons. "Massive retaliation" and "nudear deterrence'* refer to policies felt to be necessary to cope with an enmy 
capable of putting more manpower in the field. Second, 
Soviet land forces have the advantage of being conctn2~atcd 
in E m p e  and Asia relatively close to the areas moat likely 
to k a m e  the battlefields in a future conflict. United States 
manpower is dispersed in bases throughout the world. This 
dispersal force the United States to maintain a minimum 
of between 2,000,000 and 4,500,000 military men in order to 
keep ail its bases in Europe, Southeast Asia, Japan, the 
Middle East, and Africa, in addition to its hemispheric 
; defenses, adequately staffed. 
Andrei Vyshinsky dramatically raised the question of 
limiting manpower in a speech beforc the third General 
Assembly, calling for an over-aII one-third reduction of 
troop by the major powers. T h e  USSR's numerial su+ 
d t y  in armed manpower was so great that a proportional 
cut would have left the Western powers in a position of per- 
manent Xeriority. A proportional reduction of forces was 1 thu, totally unacceptable ro hem. Yet for y n n  ihe Soviet 
p m r n e n t  insisted upon a one-third proportional rduc- 
tion of troops as the basis for any limitation of manpower. 
1n its p r o p &  of I0 Mag 1955, the USSR finally aban- 
doned its insistence upon a flat percentage reduction and 
agreed to a maximum figure as desired by the three Western 
powers. It  proposed a reduction of Chinese, Soviet, and 
United States forces to 1 ,OOO,M)O-1,500,000 men, with 650,- 
000 each for France and the United Kingdom. T h i s  proposal 
had the appearance of a concession insofar as these were 
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virtually the exact figures proposed by the West in 1952 and 
by France and the United Kingdom again in 1955. But this 
concession was made conditional upon agreement that 
"States possessing military, naval and air bases in the terri- 
tories of other States shall undertake to liquidate such 
bares."m In non-diplomatic language, the Soviet Union was 
demanding dissolution af NATO and SEATO, a condition 
unacceptable to the West without a prior settlement of the 
outstanding political conflicts between the two sides. Since 
then, withdrawal of United States forces from Europe has 
substantially replaced the one-third cut as the unacceptable 
demand in Soviet manpower proposals. 
A renewed effort to solve the manpower problem was made 
in 1956. At this time Soviet representatives were stressing 
the 1,000,000-1,500,000 figure as the most suitable for a 
manpower reduction by the major powers. That figure, 
though previously acceptable, was now categorically re- 
jected by the Uni td  States. Harold Stassen explained to the 
Sub-Committee: 
When . . . the Soviet Union speaks in its proposah of force levels 
that had been suggested [by the West] under one set of condi- 
tions, which it says specifically it does not accept, it has not 
moved to meet the United States in any real sense.5' 
The United States now set a maximum of 2,500,000 for 
its own and the Soviet armies, with further reduction condi- 
tional upon settlement of outstanding political issues. The 
USSR held to the old figures and countered an 27 March 
with a proposal that agreed to consider the problem of 
reducing conventional armaments and forces without link- 
ing the agreement to any form aE nuclear disarmament. This 
in itself marked a reversal of its decade-old policy of combin- 
ing conventional and nuclear disarmament. Several months 
later Andrei Gxomyko announced Soviet willingness to 
accept the higher United States figure as part of a larger 
agreement unconditionally banning the use of nuclear wea- 
w Reprodud in US DocumtnLs, p. 387. 
61 United Nations DaE. D6183, 4 May 1956, Annex 12, p. 32. 
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ponab dcsmction of nuclear t~rxkpizcs~ and a wst cessation. 
No mention waa made of a contra1 aystrm and no apemeat 
r a t e d  
Again in London a year later, an even more intense saiw 
of mqptiaticm on manpower limitation taok place. P;nrtica- 
km emphasis was given to the problem of stagEd di9arma- 
mcgt. Xn mast cwa the unacctptablc conditiw wee in the 
rrecond or third a m g a  of the pro& agreement, For 
example, the USSR claimed a serious d o n  to compromise 
when on 90 April 1957 it to accept thc United Stattll 
figure of 2,5QD,000 men without a prior agreement to oeast 
the manufacture of atomic weapm. But as a new condition 
it demanded agreement on a ateond-stage level of 1,500,000 
men for the three large land powern. It in effect deferred 
. the breakup of NATO and SEATO to a later stage. 
During the summer of 1957 h e  United Stam couatm- 
pro@ with condidom of its own. It suggested 2,500,000 
men aa a hitatage reduction, to be Mowed in later stagerr 
by redudom to 4,100,000 and 1,700,000 men if aad when 
there waa progress toward the solution d politid hue. 
With the Soviet rejection of this condition, negotiation Em a 
reduction in manpower reached a dead end. 
T h e  history of negotiations for a separate apeement ban- 
ning nudear tests shows cansiderably more balance between 
Soviet d United States w e  of gamesmanship. The initiative 
Em a test ban agmmtnt originated with the USSR in its 
10 May 1955 plan. It mlled for a discontiauance of tests "as 
one of the first measures.'Wn 30 April 1957 the USSR a@n 
singled out the problem of nucIear tests and asked that it be 
m1vd '"withmc delay." Weithtr proposal mentioned the es- 
rabhhment of a control system to supervise a test -tion, 
although any Western consideration of a test cessation was 
cantingat upon agreement on control, 
A major change in the Soviet stand was made on 14 June 
19W, when it revemd d1 pftpious poliq and agmd to 
accept thc supemhion of an international commission. with 
o o m l  p t S  actuaIly tO be stationed on Soviet territory. 
This change immdately put the United Stam on the defen- 
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siw and permitted the USSR to seize the propaganda initia- 
tive. Probably no single issue has served the USSR better 
than that of test cessation in repairing the propaganda de- 
feat it suffered in the United Nations Atomic Energy Com- 
mision. The Achilles heel of Soviet propaganda has always 
been its resistance to control. In pushing the idea of a test 
cessation, with controls, the USSR has been able to capitalize 
on the anxiety felt throughout the world, particularly in 
Asia, over increased radiation in the atmosphere. 
Stopping nuclear tests in the absence of a broader dis- 
armament agreement was not originally Iooked upon with 
favor by the United States. Its initial argument had been 
that continued testing was needed in order to develop a 
"clean" nuclear bomb and to perfect anti-missile rnissiIes. 
T h e  United States now accepted the new Soviet proposal 
"in principle" and in turn attached several conditions. The 
Western powers on 2 July and the United States again on 2 1 
August 1957 demanded, as part oE an agreement. cessation 
of the production of fissionable materia1 for weapons pur- 
poses and establishment of a control system to guarantee 
such cessation. President Eisenhower had previously pro- 
posed a ban on the production of fissionable fuels, but at 
the time it had not been a condition for a test cessati0n.~2 
This condition was the joker in the United States response. 
In view of the known Russian objection to controls over 
Soviet production of atomic energy, such a condition would 
not easiIy be met. Moreover, the difficulty of establishing 
controIs on a cut-off in fissionable fuel production would 
have serhusly delayed agreement an a test cessation. 
Pressure was intensified against the United States when, 
on 31 March 1958, the USSR announced a unilateral cessa- 
tion of its own testing program. (Not coincidentally, this 
announcement followed the end aE a Soviet test series and 
immediately preceded the United States Nevada t a t  series.) 
In the spring of 1958 President Eisenhower proposed to 
JzLetter to Marshal Bulganin. 1 Mar. 1956. R e p d u d  in Reference Docu- 
ments, D-26. pp. 166-168. 
Premier Khrmhchev that technical t a b  limited to the dt- 
&on of nuclear blasts be held, Without explicitly a h -  
duning its demand regarding production of fissionable fuel 
(this condition was officially abandoned early in 1959), the 
United States ktter thus opened the way for the poltical 
talks on testing now k i n g  held in Geneva. The West's sole 
condition for cordusion of an agreement is now the =tab. 
lishmmt of an effective control system. As already noted, the 
cyrren<obtacles to agreement center around the 1peci6ics 
of such a system; 
These three illustrations by no meam exhaust the exam- 
plea of the gamesmanship of disarmament negotiations. In 
its fuU operation the art of disarmment negotiations is a 
mat  subtle and complex p m w .  It is a task not taken 
l@tly..The stakes are too high. Even where the prospect of 
agreement &'highly remote, she issues are most seriously 
considered and the debate is m i e d  on with the greatest 
intensity. Disarmament negotiation is just one t001-but a 
very important one-in the foreign policy arsenals of East 
and West in their struggk to build a world in their own 
-. 
I 960-A Watershed? 
To JWDCE by she recent outpouring of new proposals and 
major speeches, the year 1960 may be a; watershed of sorts. 
A new round of dkmmrnent negotiations was made p+ 
sible by the Ebt-West apeanent last summer to establish 
the tenaacion disarmament committee, which has scheduled 
the first of what promises to be many meethga for mid- 
March 1960. Some of the ideas and proposals the new com- 
mittee will consider are already known; athm are still being 
developed in national policy groups. But once again tho 
discussion may be veering toward comprehensive, rather than 
partid, disarmament. 
Of the proposals already announced, those made by Re- 
mier Khrushchev on 18 September 1959, in a speech behe  
the Cenml have received the greatest publicity. 
Actually, they encompass three different, though not mutu- 
ally exclusive, plans. Tt~c &st is "that, over a period of four 
years, all States should carry out complete disarmament and 
should divest themselves of the meam of waging war." Land 
armies, navies, air forces, atomic weapons, and missiles, along 
with overseas bases, general st&, war ministries, and even 
military ~ m l s  would cease to exist. Ta ensure complimce* 
there should be an international conm~ body "in which d l  
States would participate," 
A subsequent elaboration of this plan, submitted by the 
Soviet government, &led for achievement of "general and 
complete" disarmament in three stages: reduction of armed 
forces and conventional arm in the first stage; complete dis- 
SFor text, see GAOR: 14th k., 799th Plenary Mtg.. 18 Sept f959. 
bdment d armed forces and military bsures in the second; 
and completion of tlae mmahhg, and mmt signihnt, s t e p  
including destruction of nuclear weapom, in the 
In case the West r e j d  thb far-reaching propad, Re- 
mier Khrushehw proposed an alternative p h  for p a  
dismnamenf- In addition to calling far agreement w a cesas- 
&n of nuclear testing, the partial plan h five elements: 
(I )  creation of a eane of control and inspeaion with a rdw- 
tion of Eoreign troop in Western Europe; (2) d m  of an 
atc~n~fret zone in Central Europe; (5) withdrawal of all 
fareign troops from Europe and liquidation of m i l i m  bases 
on foreign territories; (4) conclusion of a non-aggresrirnn 
pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact state;  and (5) 
an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack. Tht gap 
between total and partial dkumament is here rather wi&. 
With she exception of the third p i n t ,  this alternative plan 
would not actually involve a reduction of either side's EOTCCS. 
Nur, with the exception of the fifth point, would it involve 
an extensive system of eonmh, 
As a third suggmion Premier Khmshchw, almmt o h d -  
cdly, re-introduced the Soviet 10 May I955 p p a h  as 
mmtituting ""a good basis fm agrtement'ko partial partiaal- 
ament rneauresPLL 
British Foreign Secretary SeIwyn Uoyd also made a majar 
p e d ~  before the United Nations, which unfortunately t a d  
td to get lotit in the welter of publicity attending the Soviet 
Premier's a p e d  the fallowing day. Mr. Lloyd's pro+, 
while not rn explicit in its call for complete dis;rrmament a 
&at suggeatsd by Premier Khwhchev, does prick for 
~ornprehensive disarmament, It would be implemented in 
thee gages, the first king essentially a stage of negotiating 
means and ends, the second a partial implcmentati~n~ tbt 
ehird aompIete implementation. With one important a c c p  
HUniM N a h  Doe. Al4219. 19 sept 1959. 
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tion, none of Mr. Lloydk proposals is new. Taken as a whoIe 
they would cover every phase of the armament race." At 
least two elements of his plan require extensive controls: a 
cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons 
purposes, and inspection against surprise attack, both of 
which are recommended to begin in the second stage. 
The creation of a peace force is the new feature of the 
Lloyd plan. Though not entirely novel, it does constitute a 
departure from recent efforts at disarmament. It marks a 
revival of the plan envisaged by the authors of the United 
Nations Charter linking disarmament with collective sec- 
urity. 
Another potentially important pr~posal-but for partiaI 
disarmament-was made by Jules M d ,  of Fmce,  at the 
Assembly. Mr. Moch compared the cutrent slate of missile 
development to that of atomic development in 1946 and 
urged that a high priority be given to measures prohibiting 
the development, manufacture, and pasession of all vehicles 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons before a "point of no 
return" is reached with respect to these, too. The vehicle 
would include satellites, rackets, supersonic or long-range air- 
craft, ocean-going submarines, aircraft camiers, and launch- 
ing pad~.~? 
The United States has not announced any major p r o p  
als, but it is clearly using this period for a major reappraisal. 
President Eisenhower may have indicated the direction of 
this re-evaluation when he tvrote to Senator Hubert Hum- 
phrey an 17 November 1959 that the risks of not reaching 
agreement may be greater than the risk of imperfect charm- 
ament controb: 
%They provide for (1) ccss~tion of nudear mting, (2) a c u t 4  in the 
p u c t i n n  of fissionable fuel for military pqmm, (3) &nad m a n p m  
imitations (4) banding wcr designated awrarnmts to the custody of an 
internatfanal control o~ganiation, (5) duction of canmtional mammts, 
(6) transEe~ of military srockd at fissionable fuel to non-weepom ua. (T) in- 
tion against sufp- attack (8) use of outer space for peaceful purparcs. 
a ban on the manufacture and u r  ok all mapons of rnm dcsmction, ;9; 
and (10) international mnmI ol military budgets. GAOR: 14rh SCgk, 198th 
Plenary Mtg., 17 Se t. 1959, paras. 47-60. 
51%. CAOI: I& h, 1st Gmtte., ) O W  Yli,  24 Oa 195% 
'me best and most a r e f a y  daborated disarmament agreemmts 
..ate likely to carry with them some rbks, at least theoretically, of 
evasion. But one must ponder, in reaching decisions on the very 
complex and dieticult suk$ect of arms cmuol, the enormom risks 
entarled if reasonable steps are not taken to curb the interna- 
tional can  tition in armaments and to move effectively in the 
direction o r disamament.~ 
That some re-thinking has already been done is clear from 
thr: important change in the United States position concern- 
g prevention of surprise attack. Ambassador Lodge told the 
irst Committee of the fourteenth Awembly that bis govern- 
ent would, in contrast to its previous stand, be willing to 
talk of political matters "concurrently" with technical ones 
at the forthcoming meetings of the ten-nation committee.5g 
hrrhmore, the United States has m&ed i m  stand on 
the Soviet demaqd for parity in negotiating groups; in addi- 
tion to accepting strict .parity on the ten-nation committee, 
the United States mcptetl a larger Soviet representation an 
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
space than it had previously been willing to. 
In July I959 Charles A. Coolidge was appointed by Presi- 
dent Eisenhower to make a study on behalf of the Depart- 
ments of State and Defense on "comprehensive and partial 
measures of arms control and reduction which, if interna- 
tionally agreed, would contribute to the achievement of 
United States national security objectives."* The report of 
the Coolidge committee is expected in early 1960 and will 
provide one sf the major bases for United States policy pro- 
pcwab in this field at the projected summit meeting in Paris 
in May as well as in the new disarmament committee. 
Despite the evidence of new thinking, however, it cannot 
be said that any of the fundamental problems previousIy 
posed has really been resolved. The "spirit of Camp DaviB" 
has not erased the elemental suspicions each side has of the 
other, nor is agreement on meaningful international inspec- 
58 Reproduced in The N m  Y w k  Times, 27 Nov. 1959. 
MCAOR: 14th SesJ., 1st Cmtu., 1027th Mtg., 14 Oct. 1959, para. 8. 
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tisn and control yet a realistic prospect. The Khrushchev 
proposals speak of "controls" to be established "in conform- 
ity with the stages in which disarmament was carried out." 
Nevertheless, in tbe same speech Premier Khrushchev made 
it clear that what the USSR "still advocate[s]" is "strict con- 
trol over the fuIfiIment of a disarmament agreement, after 
such an agreement has been reached." In the present atmos- 
phere of distrust between states, said the USSR in its elabor- 
ating statement, 
any deliberate attempt to advance inflated control requirements 
and especially t o r t  . . . mntrol before disarmament as a prr 
requisite for any rsamament measures, is tantamount to block- 
ing all approaches to the solution of the problem. 
Implied in this argument is the Soviet fear that a strict 
system of international inspection and control would give 
the West considerably more benefits in terms of penetrating 
Soviet secrecy than it would the Soviet Union in obtaining 
Western secrets. And in view of the relative openness of 
Western compared to Soviet society, this fear is justified. 
One can go still further. Philip Noel-Baker, winner of the 
1959 Nobel Peace Prize, argues that Soviet unwillingness to 
accept controls is related to the scope of the proposed dis- 
armament agreement-that is, that the economic and politi- 
cal advantages that might accrue from any agreement thus 
far proposed by the West have not justified the sacrifices the 
USSR is asked to make." As indicated in an earlier chapter 
of this study, it is evident that to the USSR controIs of the 
sort the West demands threaten to subvert the Soviet system; 
thus the price of controls may seem inordinately high and 
the question is whether any disarmament agreement is p- 
sible that will appear to the USSR to be worth this cost. 
'Is, however, the absoIute "fool-proof" system of control 
heretofore demanded by the West essential? In fact, is it 
technimIIy feasible? In an analysis dune for Columbia Zlni- 
at See hia Thc Arms Race: A Programme for World D k r t ~ r n e r t t  (London, 
Stevens. 1958). 
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w i t y  based on pdent& arid techuricd mdiq P p C l W  
*our M e b  mdudes: 
teed hem? nor ha any mtunl, or 
fmlprcwrf and £lawlesrr *elilabi2icy 
t is not only uaa#ainarblc; it ia not 
Wes- poIicy~makers are seriously d d e r i n g  what wodd 
bc the igwedients of a dimmamar. agreemeat Ebat would 
c d h  reasanably d k t i i v e  inspdm and control awl would 
t & ~ c  to t01mbJ.e limits the cmsqacx~ces of coym viola- 
tion.. A certain level .of armamentss either d n a l  ur mder 
=me kind of intmuional p1lm force, would pmumab1,y 
have to bc aIIuwd to counter the ineducible @hiBtp id 
c r w d e d  vialation in a wm1d in which it is no laager pas- 
Y e  Mr. UoJd'~l scheme far 
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prdng  peoples detmnined to change the social system in 
their m~ntries."~ 
The problem of reaching a disarmament agreement is 
further complicated by new technologiml developments in 
the arms race-particularly the apparent Soviet superiority 
in the long-range missile field. Some United States officials 
haw admitted that thae will be a "missile gap" at least be- 
tween 1961 and 1963. The United States is under pressure to 
develop an adequate counterforce and would thus be unlikely 
to Eavor a control plan, such as that suggested by Mr. M d ,  
that might deprive it of the opportunity to perfect its missiles 
and anti-missile missiles, even were the USSR to limit iwIf 
in a like fashion. 
In these circumstances, the United S t a m  will be more 
dependent than ever over the next two or three years on its 
Strategic Air Command bombens and intermediate-range 
missiles to maintain its deterrent striking power. This may 
necessitate continuing dependence on overseas bases, al- 
rhough some observers have seen in the development of such 
weapons as the 1,200-1.500 mile-range Polaris missile, which 
can be fired from a submerged atomic submarine, the pos- 
sibility of a greater and more flexible military deterrent than 
fixed bases; at least one such submarine is scheduled to any 
operational missiles by the end of 1960. When more of the 
United States ICBMs, having a 5,000-miIe range, have been 
produced, it wiIl be possible to utilize bases in continenca! 
United State for a retaliatory nuclear attack. In the interim, 
the United States seem to be counting on its presumed 
superiority in diversification of weapons and on the strength 
of its international alliances. 
To a certain extent, these considerations will affect the 
Western view of the possibility of controlled "limited disen- 
gagement" in Europe, as called for in the Khrushchev pro- 
posals, or a variant thereof such as has k e n  advocated by 
Prime Minister Maanillan. From the Soviet p i n t  of vim,  
this would be more acceptable because Soviet territory would 
Article by Yu. Z h u k ~ ~ ,  P r d ,  2 Oct. 1%9. i 
not actually be invoIved, although the of Soviet milk 
tary withdrawal from cx)untzies in Eastern Europe might be 
a caw for concern, Militarily, too, the pro+ has an 
elernat of fewibitity in that it would not enmil a ~ignifiwr 
diminution of the forces on either slide; it amounts more to 
a redeployment than to a reduction af forces. Although rhm 
b widtnce that President Eisenhower as well as Prime Min- 
ister Mamillan may be thinking along the lines of ~ ~ n e  
"thinning out" in Central Europe, such proposals 4 1  al- 
i most surely require sumt consideration of the smtw af 
: Germany, with all the pitfalls that this involves, 
1 
Prssrures on rlss G r w  Potmrs 
i 
Dcspite thege rather negative remarks, there are strong 
pressures upon the major countries both from within and 
. from other countries-especially the smaller nations-to 
make m e  headway on disarmament. T h e  most effective of 
these pressures has ken, as noted, for cessation of nuclear 
testi~g. No fewer than four out of six of the fourteenth 
Assembly resolutions on disarmament related to testing of 
nuclear weapons, and all passed overwhelmingly. One urged 
intensification of the work of the Geneva Conference to de- 
vise a test control system and another asked for a moratorium 
by all states on all further tests (passed by votes of 78-0, with 
2 abstentions, and 60-1, with 20 abstentions, respectively). 
The other two reflected concern lest the "nucIear club" grow 
and, in all likelihood, become less responsible. Fmce,  which 
has already announced that it will imminently test an atomic 
dwice in its Sahara territory, was particularly requested to 
refrain born p i n g  through with its plans. In view of the 
strength of the Western alliance, the vote of 51-16 (with 15 
abstentions) against France was surprising, Jtr another signifi- 
a t  resolution, the Assembly approved an Prish proposal the 
intent of which was to o p p t  Eurther dissemination ~f nu- 
dear weapons to those nations not now possessing them. 
Although this was watered down to a simple suggestion that 
the ten-nation disarmament committee consider the matter, 
the concern evidenced for the "nth country"prob1em was 
rear and universal. Not one dissenting vote was cast.m 
There are other pressures an the three nuclear poweft 
that relate to this "nth mtion'"prob2em. Politically the in- 
fluence that these powers now exercise inside their alliance 
systems would be diluted as their allies came to produce 
atomic weapons. Smaller nations able to produce such weap 
ons would be capable of exercising a kind of "atomic black- 
mail" to which even the largest nations wmld not be im- 
mune. A year ago this problem was referred to as the "fourth 
country" problem; today it is the "nth country." I t  is too late 
to prevent France's entry into the nudear dub. But other 
countries are now, or soon will be, in a position to embark 
on programs of their own. One report lisw twelve countries 
as being "technically able" to do so "in the near future''- 
Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, East Ger- 
many, West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Switz- 
e r I a ~ ~ d . ~ ~  Sooner or later this list will surely be expanded. It 
is evident that with greater dispersal of atomic know-how 
will come greater risk of accidental or irresponsible use of 
atomic tveapuns. 
This problem is particularly acute with regard to that 
emerging giant, the People's Republic of China. There is 
considerable belief in the West that the USSR is no more 
eager to see the People's Republic develop atomic weapons 
than is the West. Thus it may be that an agreement on 
cessation of testing would provide the USSR with an excuse 
to deny information to its ally. An agreement would not, 
W k ,  respcctiwly, General Asmmbly Res~lutions 14Q2A and 14028 (XI , 
21 Kov. 1959. 1379 (XIV) . ?ZO Nov. 1959, and 1380 (XIV), 20 Nov. 195 "4 . 
The o l c r  two resolutions continued the 82-member Diaamamtnt Com- 
mission, with an oblique indication of approval of the ]&nation committee 
(the dehatc made it  cleat that the members consider rhc Assembly a retain- 
ing; ultimate authority For approving any agreements reached), and uqcd 
arhirvemcnt of a consiructivc wlution to the problem of gcnenl and wm- 
pletc disarmament: Resolutians 1403 (XIV), 41 Nov. 1959, and 1378 (XIV). 
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however, solve the problem of what could be done if China 
developed atomic weapons an its own, and under the cir- 
cumstances no agreement that dicl not indude it would be 
effective. What is done with respect to France wirl provide 
an important precedent, since that country, too, has ipdi- 
, catd it would be -1 toward an agreement reached without 
its participation 
The most hopef~l prospect in the near future has been 
for an agreement on a controlled test cessation, although it 
i9 dear that bask questions are grill outstanding even here. 
Last November, the Soviet representative agreed, after many 
months of rebal ,  to consider new scientific data-princi- 
pally the information gathered bp tbe United States after its 
I958 "Hardtack"~tet series, which indicated that the report 
of the first Geneva conference on a control syster~l had un- 
derestimated the dificulty of detecting underground shots. 
Subsequent studies in the United States have shown the 
theoretical possibility of carrying out tests in large under- 
ground excavations that would be indistinguishable seismo- 
graphidly from earthquakes. Soviet technical experts meet- 
ing in Geneva have virtually rejected these latest studies, 
which seem to point to a need for a more extensive control 
system than originally envisaged. As of January 1960 no 
solution to this prablem was in sight, and agreement on an 
annual number of veto-free inspections had been held up 
' by theninability to agree on the technical implications of the 
new data. All this raises again the fundamental question, 
discused earlier, of whether and to what extent the USSR 
I can accept inspection and conml on its territory and whether 
the West mn accept the minimum controls that seem to be 
the maximum the USSR might allowWm 
As the military implications of a t a t  ban become clear, 
the United States, too, seems to show signs of diminishing 
enthusiasm for agreement. Some milimy opinion in the 
United States holds that the further development of tactimI 
MPresidenr Eisenhower mggrsrcd in April I959 that immediate agreement 
be reached to ban tats in the atmosphere or under water, which would not 
q u i r e  an clabomte control system. This pmpwal haa w W bscn m i d .  
weapons, the miniaturization of missile warheads (nece9pary 
in view of United States failure to develop as powerful 
propellent fuel for missiles as the USSR), and an understand- 
ing of the technical-military effects of detonations in space 
all depend on renewed testing. In an effort to offset Soviet 
missile superiority, work is going forward on perfection of 
anti-missile missiles with atomic warheads, and this work, 
too, might be retarded by a permanent test cessation. 
On the other hand, test cessation, strictly speaking, in- 
volves no real disarmament or fundamental change in the 
war potentia1 of either side, and agreement on this limited 
question should therefore be more easily reached. Test c m -  
tion tvould primarily limit the further development and 
perfection of weapons already possessed in great abundance 
in the United States and the USSR, In some aspects of nu- 
clear arms production a point of saturation has undoubtedly 
been reached. 
The question of whether or not there will be agreement 
on a permanent, controlled test ban will ultimately depend 
-as do other larger disarmament questions-on the balance 
oE needs. Is the Soviet Union's suspicion of controls greater 
than its need to reduce the drain on its economic potential 
that is represented by excessive defense expenditure? Is the 
West's fear of remaining behind in the missile race greater 
than its need to appease domestic and international pressure 
to stop testing? Is it possible to arrive a t  an agreement that 
will be of equal advantage to each side? Would a start on 
any aspect of disarmament, such as a test ban, be sufficient 
to reverse the trend of the arms race or to Iwen the risk of 
accidental war? In the absence of agreement, each side has 
left itscIE room to maneuver. The United States, on 1 Janu- 
ary, announced itself "free"t0 resame testing, though not 
without prior announcement. France continues to move for- 
ward on its projected testing. And the USSR has indicated 
that its unilateral cessation would not apply if any Wer tm 
power, presumably including France, conducted a test. 
Should a control agreement ending nuclear tats  be signed, 
it would constitute the first real breakthrough in the four- 
teen-year disarmament impasse. It might we1 establish a 
climate for further agreements, such as a thinning out of 
I forces in Central ~Gpe. Just as a cumulative i n k  in a m  adds to tensions, a gradual, balanced Limitation of mili- tary capacity should further mitigate distrust and help pre- pre the way for a long-term ddtentc. 
RecrsJlr CBmrg%# 
Witbin the past few monk,  at bast o m  area has been 
taken out of the armnar race. On 1 Decemk 1959, twelve 
I nations having claim or an interest in Antarctica ;rp;retd to 
demilitarize &at icy con tin en^ The meaty pxoh~%im ""any 
measures d a milimy nature, such as the e s t a b W a t  d 
military imes and fortidimtiom, she canyhg out cd military 
maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapms'" ' the An&rctic.H A sysfmi of inspection is provided for that 
permits each government to designate impmom and re- 
quires all ~v-epts to a d  the inspectors "mmplete 
freedom of a m  at m y  time to any or all area of Antarc- 
ti=" Each nation mmt provide the others with a timetable 
of pknned movements af expeditions and ships and with 
lists of military personnel, equipment, and trases in opera- 
tion Agreement on this quite com+ensive treaty wadi 
facilitated by Antaraids relative animpnance as a base 
for military opcratk6W 
Outer space* only now being opened up to exploratioln, 
p a  considerably grea@r problems becatwe it is the region 
through which &ik&aail, Furthermore, even instruments 
of p&a$d purpose (em&, weather-prediction meUitej) 
could be used £or military intelwae. Over the pt year 
the Committee on S p e  Research (COSPAR) of the Inter- 
national Camcil of Scientific Unions (a non-governmental 
body) has- been seeking W e t  moption  in developing 
coodinad r d  programs. Although Soviet scientists 
joined GOSPAR they threatened not to cooperate because 
the? Eelt they were under-rep~aented. In January agreement 
WText of m 9  in Thc Nmr* Fork Times, 1 fkc. 1959. 
was announced that k t  and West would have parity in 
GOSPAR'S seven-man inner cabinet (the president is to be 
a neutral). The voting procedure, in effect, gives either side 
a veto on all important decisions taken by COSPAR. An- 
other compromise has end& the Soviet boycott of the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful U s e  of Outer Space, 
whir11 the USSR felt was dominated by Weatern powem. 
Under a new membership formula agreed to in December, 
the original membership of eighteen, twelve of whom were 
allied to the West in one way or another, expanded to 
twenty-four, with t~relve from the West, seven from the Eat. 
and five neutrals. 
These recent c h m p  in the composition of the outer- 
space committees, along with the unanimous-voting proce- 
dure in the Geneva rcnference and parity of membership in 
thc new ten-nation t5hmament committee, mark the in- 
creasing success of Soviet e&orts to achieve equality with the 
West in transactions related to disarmament. To the extent 
that the changes encourage or pennit Soviet participation 
in negotiations, they constitute an advance. However, this is 
not to say that a suaessfuI conclusion to the negotiations is 
thereby ensured or even made more probabIe. 
A new role for the United Nations is foreshadowed by 
recent developments. Unlike the previous period of active 
negotiations, the forthcoming talks will nor be held under 
its direct auspices. For the t ime being, at least, the United 
Nations is less likely to be the source of a disarmament plan 
than to be the ratifla of a possible agreement, to enmurage, 
prod, or modify, but nos to create. In the Iong nm, this may 
pro.rfe to be a more realistic role far the OI.ganization. 
This trend was highlighted by the fourteenth Assembly's 
activity on the subject of disarmament. The Awmbly. in 
spite of its inability to serve as the broker for a disarmament 
transaction, lias become a powerful stimulant to action, be 
it propaganda or a serious probing for agreement. The tone 
of these debates indicates great-power awarenw that the 
current arms race concerns many more than those immedi- 
;~teIy involved. It indicates an acceptance by the great pwms 
of their rlespomibility to take steps to curb the race ors fail- 
ing that, to account EI) the United Nations for their Inability 
ta & sc. No anr has seriously &alIenged the assertion of 
tke b e t a r y - 6 e n d  last summer that dbrmment "'i9 one 
of thw quatiom of which the General Assembly should 
always be s e i 2 d " ' d s  
Given the instability and rigb of reliance: on mutual nu- 
dear deterrence, the question remains whether the extrrnaI 
p'esru~es of world opinion and the internal pressures of an 
~ a s h g l y  b ~ ~ m e  arms rac  are ruQcient to awe real 
pmgmm on general arms limimrion and conuol, m whether 
I tbe ferment of 1960 will simply turn out ta have provided 
new h m s  fm East-wess d i g a ~ e n t .  
Prrss mnftmna af 1 July f I9 .  Note No. Xl1& (Unidl Matiow N. Y.). 
50s 
- 50 YEARS 
d I 
inmihe Service of Peace With Justice 
fifty years have passed since the Camegis Endow- 
ment for International Peaca was eflabliied by 
Andrew Carnegie to "haden the abolition of infer- 
national war.'To observe this impartan) anniversary, 
the Endowment i~ undshking m extensive y e a r h g  
program, "Pempec)ives on Pasce,'"lo stimulate con- 
drudive thinking on the problems invdved in working 
for an enduring peace founded on freedam and jus- 
ti-. Eminen* ststemen and mspondble ti+izens here 
and abroad have been invited fo draw on M r  rpe- 
cia1 experience for insigh may be applied today 
and tomorrow. fdsus will be rough+ as +o specific 
measures .)hat mighf be adopted by +he Unifed S.)ates 
and o+her govemmsnts. &r) +he $may coneern will 
be a m-mvahdion of ttw ns+ure, uruxes, and condi- 
+ions of world peace in fhe nuclear age. 
#)R lNCERNATIONAL PEACE 
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